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Abstract (dt. Zusammenfassung am Ende)
The talk of an impending 'Clash of Civilisations' conceives of civilisations as a) homogenous
and b) distinct entities with regard to their respective political worldviews. Particularly Islam
or more precisely, Muslim civilisation is presumably homogenous. Its civilisational values are
held incompatible with 'Western' values thus leading to an inevitable confrontation. 
This paper inquires into the mode of the accommodation of plurality in four Muslim societies
a) de facto and b) how it is ideally conceived of. In both respects, the assumption of homo-
geneity fails even for the Arab-Iranian core area of the Muslim world. The thesis of a 'Clash
of Civilisation' is thus challenged by the counter-thesis of a 'Clash within Civilisations'. It is
validated on two levels of analysis: 
? The scope of constitutional models ranges from secular Tunisia to syntheses based on
such diverse traditions like Morocco and Saudi-Arabia to the modernist synthesis of Iran.
Common to them all is, however, that they use repressive means to control plurality. In
all those countries, the freedom of speech is severely limited with regard to issues which
are pivotal to the respective political system. It is therefore justified to scrutinise the plau-
sibility of contemporary reformist approaches against precisely this empirical back-
ground. These approaches also display a fair degree of substantial heterogeneity:
? The range of contemporary Muslim political discourse extends from extremely confla-
tionist attitudes, which claim a congruence of the fanum/sacred and profanum/profane
sphere in public life–on the one side, to extremely "de-conflationist" attitudes which are
based on a separation of civitas mundi from civitas dei, the separation of religion and the
state, on the other. The reformist attitudes toward traditional conceptualisations of plural-
ity investigated in this paper, are for the most part located in the middle of this discursive
spectrum. Thus, the projects investigated here are not holistic in the sense that they are
either 'fundamentalist' or 'secular/modernist'. On the contrary, as different as the respec-
tive projects with regard to their disciplinary and methodological approach are, they have
in common an 'anti-essentialist' outlook, i.e. they reflect the specific historical legacy and
contemporary experiences of the authors in the respective country of origin Morocco,
Tunisia, and Iran.
The results of this paper stand in contrast to Western and non-Western interpretations of
'political Islam' as necessarily 'fundamentalist' and the subsequent hypostatisation of secu-
larism to political modernity per se. Reformist intellectuals such as Moroccan al-JÁbrÐ or Ira-
nian ÝA.-K. SurÙsh, and even political actors like Tunisian R. al-GhanÙshÐ establish their
projects on a critical comprehension of both the historical tradition and actual modernity, i.e.
on the acknowledgement of Islam constantly being instrumentalised politically and secular
constitutional models being abused for the legitimisation of authoritarian rule. Such differen-
tiated projects offer a more realistic opportunity to prevent the escalation of the real Clash,
namely the one within Civilisations, and for the constructive accommodation of plurality than
the extremist slogans of ''IslÁm 'huw al-Îall/Islam the solution" or the mirror-reflected secular
battle-cry for "TajfÐf al-yanÁbÐÝ al-uÒÙliyah/draining the fundamentalists' sources":
? Both, the high degree of differentiation and of abstraction makes those projects evade
the highly ideologised interpretations of specific Islamic notions. Based on the latter, di-
chotomised conceptions more often than not represent combat positions in day-to-day
politics. Projects of the kind suggested by al-JÁbrÐ, al-GhanÙshÐ, and SurÙsh, however,
reconfigure the problematique of authenticity in whose context political innovation and
social transformation are blamed for 'westernising' one's own 'authentic' (Is-
lamic/Arab/Iranian) culture. 
? Equipped with the critique of tradition and modernity those reformist approaches do not
abandon the semantic field of Islamic tradition. More significantly, there are substantial
reinterpretations to be discovered with regard to the historical conceptualisations of plu-
rality such as "tawÎÐd/oneness of AllÁh", "ijtihÁd/individual reasoning", "naÒÐÎah/sincere
advice" and "shÙrÁ/consultation". The main thrust in the reinterpretation of these tradi-
tional concepts is to broaden political liberties of the ruled. That is, to extend participation
and freedom of speech both beyond the limits of orthodox interpretation of the mentioned
concepts and beyond the de facto confines set up by the political systems in the contem-
porary Muslim world.
Zusammenfassung
Die Rede von einem bevorstehenden 'Clash of Civilisations' beruht auf der konzeptio-
nellen Annahme, Kulturkreise seien in politisch-weltanschaulicher Hinsicht a) homogen
und b) von anderen Kulturkreisen abgegrenzt. Eine solche Homogenität wird insbeson-
dere für den islamischen Kulturkreis postuliert. Darauf aufbauend wird behauptet, seine
zivilisatorischen Werte seien mit denen 'des' Westens unvereinbar. Diese Unvereinbar-
keit führe letztlich zum 'Clash'. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht, wie mit Pluralität de facto umgegangen wird und be-
leuchtet Vorstellungen vom idealen Umgang mit ihr. Sie zeigt, daß die Annahme einer
Homogenität schon im arabisch-iranischen Kernraum des islamischen Kulturkreises
dem tatsächlichen Sachverhalt keineswegs entspricht. Der These vom 'Clash of Civili-
sations' stellt diese Arbeit die Gegenthese eines 'Clash within Civilisations' entgegen; ih-
re Überprüfung geschieht auf zwei Ebenen:
? Das Spektrum der Verfassungsmodelle reicht vom säkularen Tunesien über Syn-
thesen auf traditioneller Basis, aber in unterschiedlicher Ausformung, in Marokko
und Saudi-Arabien, bis hin zur modernistischen Synthese in Iran. Gemeinsam ist
allen untersuchten politischen Systemen, daß sie, unabhängig vom Grad der Säku-
larität, Pluralität repressiv behandeln. Anlaß genug, zeitgenössische Reformansätze
auf ihre Plausibilität vor diesem Hintergrund zu untersuchen.
Auch diese Ansätze zeigen ein hohes Maß an inhaltlicher Heterogenität
? Das Spektrum des zeitgenössischen muslimischen politischen Diskurses reicht von
der extrem conflationistischen Perspektive, d.h. vom In-eins-denken der weltlichen
und der sakralen Sphäre (zum Begriff: Salvatore 1997), bis zu ihrem extremen de-
conflationistischen Gegensatz, der strikten Trennung von fanum und profanum im
öffentlichen Raum. Die reformistischen Auslegungen der hier untersuchten, ur-
sprünglich traditionalen Konzepte, die für die Bearbeitung von Pluralität relevant
sind, liegen überwiegend auf dem mittleren Teil dieses Spektrums. Die z.T. nur im
weitesten Sinne politischen Projekte der Reformisten sind also nicht in dem Sinne
holistisch, als sie entweder durchgängig als 'säkular' oder als 'fundamentalistisch'
bezeichnet werden könnten. Im Gegenteil, so sehr sich die Projekte hinsichtlich ih-
res disziplinären und methodischen Ansatzes auch unterscheiden, gemeinsam ist
ihnen, daß sie 'anti-essentialistisch' sind, d.h. sie widerspiegeln den konkreten histo-
rischen und zeitgenössischen Erfahrungshorizont der Autoren gemäß ihrer Her-
kunftsländer Marokko, Tunesien und Iran.
Über die Eigen- und Fremddeutungen des 'politischen Islam' als zwingend 'fundamenta-
listisch' und die daraus folgende Hypostasierung 'des' Säkularismus zu der politischen
'Moderne' weist nun die Tatsache hinaus, daß wichtige Intellektuelle, wie der Marokka-
ner M. A. al-JÁbrÐ oder der Iraner ÝA.-K. SurÙsh, und sogar politische Akteure wie der
Tunesier R. al-GhanÙshÐ ihre Projekte auf einem kritischen Verständnis jeweils beider
Pole, sowohl der historisch konkreten Tradition als auch der Moderne, aufbauen, d.h.
auf dem Wissen und um die politische Instrumentalisierung von Islam und um den Miß-
brauch säkularer Staatsformen zur Legitimierung von autoritärer Herrschaft. Soll nun
der reale 'Clash within Civilisations' verhindert werden, bieten solche differenzierten
Projekte realere Chancen für einen konstruktiven Umgang mit Pluralität als die extremi-
stischen Ansätze entlang der Parole 'IslÁm 'huw al-Îall / Islam ist die Lösung' oder
(spiegelbildlich) gemäß des säkularistischen Kampfrufes nach 'TajfÐf al-yanÁbÐÝ al-
uÒÙliyah / Trockenlegung der fundamentalistischen Quellen'. 
? Durch den hohen Grad sowohl an Differenzierung als auch an Abstraktion sind sol-
che Reformansätze den hoch polarisierten Begriffs-, Geschichts- und Gegenwarts-
deutungen entzogen, die die häufig genug real beobachtbaren Kampfpositionen im
politischen Geschehen vor Ort bilden. Projekte der Art, wie sie al-JÁbrÐ, al-GhanÙshÐ
oder ÝA.-K. SurÙsh vorschlagen, konfigurieren indessen auch die sog. 'Authentizi-
täts-Problematik' neu, in deren Kontext sich jede politische Innovation oder soziale
Veränderung dem Vorwurf ausgesetzt sieht, sie 'verwestliche' die eigene, 'authenti-
sche' (islamische, arabische oder iranische) Kultur.
? Dergestalt ausgerüstet mit der Kritik an Tradition und Moderne, verlassen die Re-
formansätze auf den ersten Blick das semantische Feld der islamischen Tradition
nicht. Es werden aber bedeutende inhaltliche Neubestimmungen der hier unter-
suchten historischen Konzeptualisierungen von Pluralität vorgenommen, von Be-
griffen wie tawÎÐd/Einheit Gottes, ijtihÁd/individuelles Bemühen um eine gerechte
Lösung, naÒÐÎah/Ermahnung und shÙrÁ/Konsultation. Diese Neubestimmungen be-
gründen insgesamt eine breitere politische Mitsprache der Regierten. Damit liegen
bilden Bausteine eines zeitgemäßen Gegenprojekts vor, das gerichtet ist gegen die
autoritäre Restriktion säkular begründeter politischer Mitsprache und Meinungsfrei-
heit in den zeitgenössischen politischen Systemen der islamischen Welt.
Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................................ 1
1) Empirical Evidence............................................................................................................ 3
1.1) Methodology................................................................................................................... 3
1.1.1) Hypothesis, related findings and approach ............................................................. 3
1.1.2) Choice of indicators and cases ............................................................................... 4
1.2) Case Studies .................................................................................................................. 5
1.2.1) Traditionalist Synthesis I: Morocco.......................................................................... 5
1.2.2) A Secular Republic: Tunisia .................................................................................... 8
1.2.3) Traditionalist Synthesis II: Saudi-Arabia................................................................ 10
1.2.4) A Modernist Synthesis: Iran .................................................................................. 13
1.2.5) In sum: Different degrees of secularisation–similar deficiencies............................ 22
2) Contemporary Muslim political discourse: 
Between Conflationism and  Deconflationism ................................................................. 23
2.1) Genesis ........................................................................................................................ 25
2.2) Conflationism and deconflationism–contextualised....................................................... 29
2.3) Plurality as an object of Muslim political discourse ....................................................... 28
2.3.1) "TawÎÐd/oneness of God" vs. political plurality? .................................................... 29
2.3.2) "IjtihÁd/individual reasoning" and innovation of religious thought........................... 34
2.3.3) "NaÒÐÎah/sincere advice" and freedom of expression ........................................... 42
2.3.4) "ShÙrÁ/consultation" vs. democracy?.................................................................... 44
3) Conclusions..................................................................................................................... 47
References .......................................................................................................................... 53
Zusammenfassung


1Introduction1
The ‘Clash of Civilisations’ is not only imminent but it is already taking place. Contrary to
general assumptions, however, for the most part the real clash is not taking place between
distinct ‘civilisations’ or cultural entities ('Kulturkreise') but within each of them. Islam or
rather, Muslim civilisation is one–arguably the most ‘prominent’–case in point for the struggle
with plurality.2  
"Plurality" first of all denotes the general condition of most contemporary societies in the
world. As for the empirical part of the paper, the notion of plurality shall not imply a normative
predisposition toward the praise of ”pluralism” as a value sui generis. "Plurality" will, how-
ever, acquire additional meaning in the theoretical second part of the paper.
In the first part, "plurality" denotes the empirical observation of diverging opinions, values,
beliefs and interests within contemporary groups, societies, and states. In contrast to tradi-
tional societies, conflict over these divergences surpasses the limits of even the most gen-
eral frame of common reference–be it the religious community, the nation etc. The main
question here is whether these divergences are being dealt with peacefully or not, by sup-
pression or by accommodation, by indifference toward public virtues or by public negotiation
of morality. The problem is lucidly exhibited by historian M. Talbi (Tunis): 
"Nous allons vers un pluralisme universel qu'il nous faut penser et que l'on doit ap-
prendre à gérer." The main target is thus: "Tout homme doit accepter le pluralisme,
c'est-à-dire la cohabitation pacifique avec autrui sur la base du droit à la différence."
(1998:110, 113f)
Today, the most important pluralist challenge is that of the nominally 'secular' public order
being questioned by both ever larger and ever more militant groups in Muslim society. This,
of course, is only comprehensible against the background of a rather negative balance sheet
of the secular project in Muslim societies. 
In this paper I will argue that the imposition of nationalist, socialist and (to a lesser extent
and only recently) liberal secular political systems on Muslim societies has failed to create
peaceful political cultures in general and in the long-run, i.e. since the abolition of the caliph-
ate in 1924 up to today. This is mainly due to three inter-linked factors:
? The strong refutation by secular regimes of the most demands for public recognition of
Muslim values or even basic religious ordinances as a public code of conduct in public
space.
? Against the background of serious development-crises and its well known consequences
(rural exodus, urbanisation, unemployment) gradually more and more segments of soci-
ety became politicised. An anti-secular, though not in always militant counter-
intelligentsia emerged. Arguably following Gramsci’s model of first attaining ideological
                                                          
1 In order to facilitate the access to references from the World Wide Web, an online-version of this paper with the
relevant URLs as operative hyperlinks is available at <http://www-user.uni-bremen.de/~bjtraut/clash>. I am in-
debted to J. MomtÁzÐ and to Í. MseÎlÐ for invaluable advice on translating tricky bits from the Persian and Arabic.
I received valuable comments on the Iranian case study from R. Haag-Higuchi/Bamberg University.
2 In addition to the case of Islam, on the Chinese, Buddhist and the Hindu cases from the perspective of
intercultural philosophy, cf. Senghaas (1998 German, 1999 augmented English version).
2superiority before entering in the political arena,3 this intelligentsia eventually also gained
political influence. Islamist ideology attracted attention from those parts of society that so
far either had been marginalised (Iran, Algeria, Indonesia). Alternatively, it attracted
those, who had merely been instrumentalised against the threat from the political left
(Egypt, Turkey) by secularist élites. In any case, this resulted in the establishment of an
anti-(or, chronologically: post-) secularist counter public (”Gegenöffentlichkeit”) or coun-
ter-culture.4
? The very process of secularisation "from above" incited or at least enhanced the ideolo-
gisation of political conflict over the question of modernisation. Secularism’s potentially
appeasing effect on ideological conflict was thus reversed into that of a catalyst for the
eruption of antagonisms into open conflict. 
Only as the failure of implementing the secularist projects in Muslim societies became obvi-
ous and resulted in a material threat to the power of the ruling élites, the latter more or less
openly bowed to anti-secularist movements–according to the respective power constellations
to various degrees, and at different stages. The results were ambivalent: On the whole, by
admitting religious parties to elections or by partially accepting sharÐÝah alongside secular
law, the ideological spectrum within the respective society is represented more accurately in
the 'official' political process. For specific groups, however, this transformation has resulted
in an adverse effect, like certain sharÐÝah-stipulations in family law have discriminatory effects
on women or sharÐÝah-stipulations in penal law for criminal offenders (Îadd-penalties). 
The operation of half-heartedly bowing to anti-secularist demands defused political tension
and relieved the pressure on ruling élites only for a short term. The (re-)introduction of Is-
lamic law mostly having lacked adaptation to contemporary times, the backlash did not wait
for long. As a result, de-secularising political systems end up with the very same problems of
accommodating plurality as they did when they were more secular. 
Not even synthetic political systems have escaped the dilemma: neither traditionalist synthe-
ses of secular and pre-secular constitutional orders (Morocco, Saudi-Arabia), nor modernist
ones (Iran) have produced convincing models for a reconciliation of religious legitimacy of
government on the one hand and political pluralism, on the other.
This clearly establishes the need for innovation in the field of political and legal theory. Con-
temporary projects overcoming secularist ideology and the deadlocks of both Islamic ortho-
doxy and Muslim fundamentalism will be presented in the second part of the paper. At this
stage, the notion of 'plurality' acquires a fuller meaning, not merely denoting the subject–but
in addition, the mode of theoretical deliberation within contemporary Muslim political dis-
course: It will become clear that there exists a variety of approaches that differ from each
other in various dimensions. This plurality of political thought concerning contemporary
problems of Muslim societies clearly surpasses the popular analytical dichotomisations of
'secular' vs. 'fundamentalist' and 'authentic' vs. 'imported'. If any at all, alternative categories
of conceptualisation will be applied here.
                                                          
3 Cf. al-AfÐf al-AkhÃar: TajfÐf al-yanÁbÐÝ al-uÒÙliyah (sic! "Draining of the Fundamentalist's Sources...") in: al-ÍayÁt
(London) November 11th, 1997.
4 Ben Achour (1993:256)
3The last part of the paper endeavours an evaluation of the said approaches with regard to
their potential contribution in dealing with plurality of against the background of the empirical
overlook.
1) Empirical Evidence
1.1) Methodology
Today, the confrontation between secular and anti-secular forces displays a spectrum from
the symbolical issue of women carrying the veil in public space to the discussion on the ap-
plicability of Islamic revealed law, ash-sharÐÝah, in politics and everyday life. The means of
confrontation reach from exile opposition (Tunisia, Saudi Arabia) to armed insurgence (Alge-
ria) or civil war (Yemen). Outright political participation of or government by explicitly anti-
secularist groups is a rare phenomenon (Jordan for the former, Iran and Afghanistan for the
latter).
1.1.1) Hypothesis, related findings and approach
The main hypothesis carrying through the empirical part of the paper is that successful ac-
commodation of plurality is by and large independent of the degree to which political systems
in the Middle East and North Africa are formally, i.e. mainly with regard to their constitutional
foundations, secularised. 
Apparently, this assumption runs counter conventional wisdom. This, however, is mainly due
to a different approach. The prevailing approach is by way of inquiry into the compatibility of
"Islam" with whatever notion of (mostly Western-style, i.e. parliamentary) "democracy". To
no one's real surprise, the results mostly confirm a negative association between the two.5
Somewhat more relevant to the subject of this paper is the empirical finding (on a world-wide
scale) of a positive association between the accommodation of plurality in terms of govern-
ments' respect for human and civil rights on the one side, and the relevant constitutional
"promises" to the citizens on the other.6 
"Culture" in general, i.e. in terms of states belonging to either "the West" or to various spe-
cific–religiously, linguistically and/or regionally defined–"civilisations" (Huntington 1996) plays
a role only with regard to governments' respect for civil rights (participatory rights), not for
the "core" human rights. A significant negative relationship was empirically established be-
tween the former on the one hand, and all non-Western civilisations (including the "Islamic"
one) on the other.7 
While the former approach neglects the cultural dimensions of the respective constitutional
foundations, the latter, culturalist approach does not differentiate the varying measure to
                                                          
5 Cf. Abdelwahhab al-Affendi: The 'Democratic Deficit' in the Muslim World. Paper presented to the 'Seminar on
Islamism, Pluralism and Civil Society' International Forum for Islamic Dialogue (Islam21)/London on April 23rd,
1999 <http://www.islam21.org/main/23apr_affendi2.htm>, Binder (1998), Midlarsky (1998), Sadiki (1998), Van-
hanen (1997:117-27), Esposito/Voll (1996), special issue of Journal of Democracy 7 (1996) 2
<http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/toc/jodv007.html#v007.2>.
6 Most conducive for the respect of civil and human rights turned out to be the reference to a) the freedom of the
press, and b) the mentioning of emergency rules in the constitution, cf. Davenport (1996:627-54), I owe this ref-
erence to A. Liese.
7 Cf. Hamm (1997:31-35), I owe the reference to A. Liese.
4which constitutions and subordinate law reflect local cultural traditions at all. 
In order to fill this gap, my point of reference is precisely the degree of secularisation political
systems are conceived by, i.e. the extent to which constitutional theory is designed from
non-secular sources, in particular from Muslim legal theory. Now, if successful accommoda-
tion of political plurality (legal reality) is empirically not in the first place dependent on the
secular character of the respective political project, then one of the major arguments fails
against the formulation of those Muslim modernist projects which aim at overcoming secu-
larist ideology. Some of those contemporary political projects will be presented in the second
part of the paper.
1.1.2) Choice of indicators and cases
Indicators as to the extent of secularisation
While a minimum of reference to revelation seems imperative for political legitimacy even in
the most secular systems (Tunisia's religion de l'Etat), 'Islam' or more specifically, revealed
law, ash-sharÐÝah, is referred to in order to legitimise both, 'traditional' government (Mo-
rocco's bayÝah to the king) and opposition's claims for political participation (demand for the
establishment of a parliamentary body, majlis ash-shÙrÁ in Saudi-Arabia).
The status and application of religious law, i.e. references made to sharÐÝah primarily in con-
stitutional, but also in family and penal law may be regarded as the strongest indicators as to
the extent of secularisation of the respective political systems. Mere labels invoking religious
connotations of institutions or offices (cf. "Islamic Republic", President as "'amÐr al-
muÝminÐn/guide of the believers") are less reliable but may still be indicative at least with re-
spect to the self-image of the ruling élites.
A second indicator covers the degree to which political parties with anti-secular agenda (or
with an explicitly secular agenda in non-secular political systems) are in legal terms able to
participate in political life . 
Since these indicators are expected to significantly vary over time, a chronological dimension
is included in the analyses. 
Indicators for the accommodation of plurality
As to the question of whether plurality is successfully accommodated or not, indicators in-
clude the existence of armed opposition, occurrence of violent conflict, and documented hu-
man and civil rights violations from the side of the governments such as limitations on the
freedom of expression, and on political participation. Sources are reports provided by inter-
national8, regional9 and the respective national human rights organisations, and political op-
position groups.
                                                          
8 E.g. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, Derechos.
9 E.g. Le Maghreb des droits de l'Homme <http://www.maghreb-ddh.sgdg.org/index.html> mirror-sited at the
Réseau Associatif et Syndical (Paris), <http://www.ras.eu.org/maghreb-ddh/>.
51.2) Case Studies
The empirical overlook includes Tunisia as one of the most thoroughly secularised political
systems in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia and Morocco as two rather variant cases for a
traditionalist synthesis, and Iran as a modernist synthesis of secular and religious political
thought and practice. 
Evidently, the extent of secularity of a political system is more difficult to determine in the
case of a synthesis. The more so, if this synthesis, as in the case of Iran, is not based on
fragments of secular or, more specifically Western political theory on the one side, and a
mere continuation of Muslim orthodox religious tradition on the other. The discontinuity of the
religious tradition by a paradigmatic transformation of orthodox political and legal thought
makes the modernist synthesis in the case of Iran difficult to assess–and also rather lengthy,
compared to the other three cases. Other factors must be kept in mind that make Iran a spe-
cial case apart from the others, and thus limit the comparability with respect to the depend-
ent variable, accommodation of plurality. The most significant dynamic anomalies lie in the
fact of Iran having undergone a popular revolution (1979), and having been exposed to an
international war (1980-88). Structural variance occurs in Iran's high ethnic diversity, and the
population's predominantly ShÐÝi denomination (compared to the predominantly SunnÐ de-
nomination in the other three cases). All specificities of the case notwithstanding, Iran has
been cited as the most pertinent example for the "Failure of Political Islam" (Roy 1992) in
general. On the other hand, some of the concepts that will be referred to in chapter II of the
paper as pivotal notions of the current Muslim reformist discourse had been implemented in
the Iranian constitutional system. It is therefore indeed justified to take a closer look into this
case than into the others.
1.2.1) Traditionalist Synthesis I: Morocco
The political system of the constitutional "Kingdom of Morocco" (al-mamlakah al-
maghribiyah) may be classified as a synthesis of secular and traditional elements. In con-
trast to other Muslim and especially Arab countries, Morocco only came under indirect
French (mandate) rule and thus evaded thorough colonisation by Western powers. Secular-
ist state ideology was never officially propagated by the rulers. On the contrary, nominally,
the sovereign derives its legitimacy from his claim on being a descendant from the prophet's
family. On this basis, and on the basis of the annually renewed traditional oath of
bayÝah/tribute by the subjects10, King Íassan II claims the office of amÐr al-muÝminÐn/leader
of the believers. Article 19 of the constitution prescribes the functions of the office as fol-
lows:11
"The King, "Amir Al-Muminin"(Commander of the Faithful), shall be the Supreme
Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the
                                                          
10 According to the king, the oath of allegiance represents the basis of national consensus–by mutually commit-
ment: "I am just as under obligation to my subjects as they are toward me. Simultaneously, I am their subordinate
and their King…" cf. his interview with E. Laurent in: "La mémoire d'un roi" éd. Plon 1993.
11 Cf. the 1996 (amended) constitution from the official website of the Ministry of Communication
<http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/state_st/constitution.htm> (inoperative at time of print).
6guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender of the
Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the Protector of
the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups and organisation s. The King
shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of
the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries."
De facto, while multiple political parties legally exist, all of them are pro-monarchist, and the
king retains the last veto power in all political questions. So far, the ruler has been able to
play a divide et impera-game with the party system thus rather sustaining the clientele-
system (co-optation of party leaders in government) as a continuation of the traditional (pre-
colonial) makhzan-principle of a–however limited autonomous–regional rule.12 Since the
king's power is pre-constitutional, it is neither theoretically limited by the constitution,13 nor
does the formal division of power de facto restrict the king's rule (exerted by the Ministry of
the Interior).
Although Islam is the religion of the state according to art. 6, the constitution makes no ex-
plicit reference to Islamic law, the sharÐÝah. Like in most other Muslim countries, family- and
personal status-law are heavily influenced by sharÐÝah.14 One example is the legality of poly-
gyny–like in all Arab countries (except for Tunisia). Recent efforts to modernise family- and
personal status-law, incited fierce protests from Islamist groups like rÁbiÔah al-mustaqbal al-
islÁmÐ/League of the Islamic Future.15 The latter claims the implementation of sharÐÝah as the
most important source of all legislation. In general, Islamist groups gained influence for the
most part from the early 1990ies onward and mainly among students. Islamist groups also
participated in a public hunger revolt in 1984 and in a general strike in 1990. 
The existing five dozen unions, associations, and groups, about 30 of whom may be consid-
ered 'Islamist', are neither legal nor strictly illegal. In the case of the group al-islÁÎ wa 'l-
tajdÐd/Reform and Renovation of ÝAbdallÁh BinkirÁn, the license as a political party was de-
nied in 1997. As a valve for this moderate Islamist group's pressure, however, they were
endorsed to send members to a board of a barely existing, but legal party. As for the earlier,
more fundamental and anti-monarchist Islamist opposition, that of ÝAbd as-SalÁm YasÐn's al-
jamÁÝat 'l-Ýadl wa 'l-iÎsÁn/Association for Justice and Welfare (officially dissolved in 1989) and
its journal al-jamÁÝah,16 government repression went as far as to put the person under house
arrest (from 1989 until 1997). Like the rÁbiÔah, it claims the introduction of sharÐÝah into the
legal system of the state. Similar to handling the legal political parties, the ruler carries a twin
                                                          
12 The persistence of the makhzan-principle as the dominant feature of contemporary political culture has re-
cently been criticised in the conference organised by the Moroccan Association de défense des droits de
l'Homme, February 2nd, 1999: "…le dialogue [politique, BJT] est perverti au Maroc, dans la mesure où le Mak-
hzen impose à l'opposition que les propositions de cette dernière doivent avoir son aval (celui du Makhzen [i.e.
du roi, dans ce contexte, BJT]) quant au contenu et à leur forme, avant de les formuler," cf.
<http://www.maghreb-ddh.sgdg.org/actualite/zaazaa2.html>.
13 Cf. Article 100 [Restrictions of Constitutional Amendment]: "The monarchic form of the State as well as the
provisions relating to the Islamic religion cannot be the object of a constitutional revision."
14 Cf. Hegasy (1997:63).
15 Led by law professor A. ar-RaysÙnÐ.
16 Cf. the journal's electronic edition <http://www.aljamaareview.com/> and particularly the fundamental critique
of King's rule in YasÐn's letter to Íasan II in al-IslÁm aw aÔ-ÔoufÁn ("Islam or the Deluge, 1974") in
<http://www.aljamaareview.com/TOUFANE/TOUFAN01.HTM>. On YasÐn's discourse on political pluralism cf.
Shahin (1996:167-86). One of the most serious constraints to achieving broad popularity is the fact, that YásÐn's
movement incorporates ÒÙfÐ-(mystical) elements, which are rather foreign to the Moroccan custom, according to
J. Gould in his lecture to the BRISMES Annual Conference, Selly Oaks, July 5th, 1998.
7strategy of repression on the one side, and integration, even encouragement on the other
(like in Tunisia and Egypt, Islamist groups were funded in the '80ies against the threat from
the political left). Several independent national human rights organisations were founded
since the end of the 80ies, a national human rights charter was established in 1990.17 In
1993, an independent forum was founded for the scholarly discussion of the relevance of
Islamic ethics for democracy in Northern African public space.18 
To sum up, the existence of political prisoners, especially those from Islamist background,19
cannot be denied. Massive state interference occurs as soon as the constitutionally stipu-
lated "opinions expressed may be injurious to the monarchical system and the religion of
Islam or derogatory to the respect owed the king and the system of state religion."20 A fur-
ther, de facto "taboo-issue" is the status of the Western Sahara as an integral part of Mo-
rocco. Thus, essentially within the limits of the (already restrictive) constitution, human and
civil rights are respected. Compared to the amount of political violence in other North African
countries, the system of Íassanisme (Faath) managed political plurality rather smoothly.21
With the recent demise of Íassan, prospects for the transformation of the political system
into a constitutional monarchy and for an increase of respect for basic human rights such as
the freedom of speech are promising. Íassan's successor, MuÎammad VI, is reportedly in-
clined to follow the Spanish model of King Juan Carlos as the guarantor for the transforma-
tion from Franco's dictatorship to democracy.
One of the most innovative and influential theorist of social and political reform in Morocco is
the philosopher MuÎammad ÝAbd al-JÁbrÐ. Some aspects of his approach toward an authen-
tic modernity and particularly toward democratisation of Arab/Muslim society will be dis-
cussed in the second part of the paper (2.3). 
                                                          
17 For a French translation cf. Charte nationale des droits de l'homme/Maroc <http://www.maghreb-
ddh.sgdg.org/textes/charte-maroc.html> established (among others) by the Organisation Marocaine des Droits
Humains <http://www.maghrebnet.net.ma/omdh/intro.htm>. Cf. also the Comité de défense des droits humains
<http://www.ras.eu.org/maghreb-ddh/actualite/cddh.html> and various women's rights organisations cf. Fadéla
Sebti's collection <http://www.techno.net.ma/femmes/associat.htm>.
18 Two major topics are dealt with in various conferences: "Islamic Ethics and the Foundations of Democracy
<http://www.ned.org:80/page_3/Prologues/program1.html>" and "An Open Dialogue on Democracy and its Rele-
vance to Muslim Societies <http://www.ned.org:80/page_3/Prologues/program2.html>", the respective proceed-
ings are published in the bilingual publication al-MuqaddamÁt/Prologues.
19 Amnesties for political prisoners have regularly excluded 'Islamist' detainees. Plans for the coming amnesty
are feared to repeat this pattern, cf. Liberty for the Muslim World communication info@liberty.nekonect.co.uk
from October 10th, 1998.
20 Cf. art. 39 of the 1996 (revised) constitution on the limits of parliament members' indemnity. Neither the "state
system of monarchy" nor "the prescriptions related to the religion of Islam may be subject to a constitutional
revision" according to art. 106, cf. <http://www.mincom.gov.ma/english/generalities/state_st/constitution.htm>.
21 For one of the harshest critics, cf. Gilles Perrault's: "Notre amie le roi" (2nd edition Paris 1998, online:
<http://www.internatif.org/hotes/Maroc/index.html>, its distribution is prohibited in Morocco. For detailed accounts
of the current human rights situation cf. U.S. Department of State Morocco Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1998, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26th, 1999,
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/morocco.html>.
81.2.2) A Secular Republic: Tunisia
The Tunisian constitution makes four references to Islam: The preamble mentions "the
teachings of Islam" as the first goal "to remain faithful to", but many others follow, like the
attachment 
"...to the unity of the Greater Maghreb, to its membership of the Arab family, to co-
operation with the African peoples in building a better future, and with all peoples who
are struggling for justice and liberty."
The second reference is made in Article 1 [State], defining: "Tunisia is a free State, inde-
pendent and sovereign; its religion is the Islam, its language is Arabic, and its form is the
Republic." art. 38 stipulates the Head of State (the president) be a Muslim: "His religion is
Islam". As a consequence, eligibility of the office is restricted to Tunisians who are (among
other conditions) of "Moslem religion" (art. 40).
No reference to sharÐÝah is made in the constitution. As for the family- and personal status
laws, they are considered the most secularised of the Muslim world. Tunisia is the only Arab
country where polygyny is not only prohibited but even penalised, indicating a clear depar-
ture from the once dominant religious MÁlikÐ-law school.
Also in contrast to other Muslim countries, secular and religious judicial systems were unified
as early as 1956. The political system thus changed from an officially religious one, to one of
a state religion (religion de l'Etat).22 
Like in Morocco, the evolution of the post-independence political system was largely directed
by the one person on top, Bourguiba. Contrary to king Íasan of Morocco, however, Bour-
guiba, did not situate himself–or Tunisia for that matter–, in the Muslim world. Like Mustafa
Kemal in Turkey some decades earlier, Bourguiba conceived of all religious tradition as an
obstacle to modernisation. He thus confronted the traditional ÝulamÁ' by inciting Muslims not
to observe the fifth 'pillar of Islam', the duty of fasting in the month of RamaÃÁn. With the
formula of a 'state religion' Bourguiba attained a de facto secularization of the state less by
challenging or even provoking religious establishment (like Atatürk) than by interpretation of
tradition.23
In the 1970ies, the system of Bourguiba suffered a severe crisis of authority due to open
confrontations with workers' unions and university students. The unrest manifested itself in
strikes, demonstrations, tensions even within the unity party, and eventually lead to the
emergence of opposition parties. Paranoid by fear from the political left, the Tunisian gov-
                                                          
22 One of Tunisia's most eminent jurists, Yadh Ben Achour, gives a concise definition of what he considers as a
social consensus on the question of secularism in Tunisia today: Pratique religieuse dans l'Etat, ni au-dessus, ni
contre, ni à coté: c'est ce qui semble être aujourd' hui communément accepté" (1994:362). The author seems to
be aware of the fact that proposals of privatising belief as a "religion du for intériereur" (1993:256f, explicit refer-
ence to Luther's "Freiheit des Christenmenschen"!) or "intérioriser la foi" (Talbi 1998:123) may only be one pos-
sible option but yet not a reality for Muslim societies.
23 The attack on the fasting habit was based on a ÎadÐth by prophet MuÎammad making the negligence of this
duty venial in case of combat (of Muslims against non-Muslims in the original context). In Bourguiba's interpreta-
tion, the fight against under-development in one's own society was a case in point for such a combat, cf. Ben
Achour (1994:358).
9ernment, like the ones in Morocco, Egypt, and elsewhere in the Muslim world, then backed
Muslim groups in order to counter the threat to its own power.24 
The one sphere where the ambivalence with regard to the secular character of the state had
never ceased to persist was the educational system. As Tunisian students started taking up
religious studies the contradictory character of the normative foundations of the state was
increasingly obvious: While religious law texts conceived of the state as a caliphate, Tuni-
sia's constitution declared the country a republic, while the former holds polygyny legal, Tu-
nisia's family law declares it strictly illegal. 
The incoherence of the situation became manifest, as Islamist groups mainly originating
from university started to organise for a radical change of the political system. As a conse-
quence, the conflict between the former and the state escalated on the background of a se-
vere economic crisis (civil unrest in 1983/1984 as protest against rise in food prices). The
confrontation between the state and the Islamists reached a militant climax in early 1987.
Only day before an alleged coup by the Islamists, general Ben Ali took over power from
Bourguiba. Initially, the take-over was welcomed by the Islamists from the Mouvement de la
tendence islamique led by R. al-GhanÙshÐ25 and ÝA. al-MÙrÙ'. Their initial confidence in being
able to participate in the political process after the removal of the autocratic Bourguiba re-
gime dissolved quickly. The party, renamed in an-nahÃah/Renaissance, was denied a li-
cense for participation in the elections on the grounds that it represented a religious group
not a political party.26 Thus, elections ever since produced a parliament without any political
opposition to the de facto unity party, Rassemblement constitutionel démocratique (RCD). 
The conflict over the secular character of the state escalated again in 1989 when the minis-
ter of education, M. SharfÐ, announced a reform of the religious education in order to make it
compatible with the (secular) laws of the state. An-nahÃah demanded the minister's dis-
missal from office and started to agitate politically (strikes, violent clashes) mainly within the
universities. The movement, representing a union of several smaller groups, repeatedly but–
to date–in vain applied for registration as a political party. Contrary to the government's dis-
course of liberalization, i.e. acceptance of political plurality and contest of its power, the ex-
tent of civil liberties de facto diminished, compared to the Bourguiba period. And despite the
relevant obligations Tunisia entered with the signing of the Association Treaty with the Euro-
pean Community in 1995, its contemporary human rights situation deteriorates steadily.27
Since 1989, al-GhanÙshÐ has lived in exile. Some of his considerations as to the future politi-
cal system in Tunisia will be discussed in the second part of the paper (2.3). 
                                                          
24 Cf. Ben Achour (1994:359), al-AfÐf al-AkhÃar: TajÐf al-yanÁbÐÝ al-uÒÙliyah (sic! "Draining the Fundamentalist's
Sources...") In: al-ÍayÁt (London) November 11th, 1997.
25 For his biography cf. an-NahÃa's official website:
<http://www.ezzeitouna.org/annahdha/english/history/portrash.htm>.
26 The party law of 1988 denies registration to any party based in its program on race, language, religion or
gener. Furthermore, it demands the party's acknowledgement of the republican form of the state, the sovereignty
of the people, of the personal status law, of human rights, and the Arab-Islamic identity, cf. Faath (1994:277).
27 Cf. Amnesty International's general secretary P. Sané in 1996 after a visit to Tunis where he was denied ac-
cess to political prisoners: "There is a great sophistication in this police-state. There is no more brutal bloody
repression, it is much more subtle." pp 4f. According to the general secretary of the Fédération internationale des
Ligues des droits de l'homme (FIDH), P. Baudouin, makes human rights activists responsible for the bad image
of the government, not the human rights violations proper, both cit. from Le Monde Diplomatique (1997), no. 2.
For more detailed accounts on political detainees, harassment and torture, cf. most recently the Amnesty country
report <http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar98/mde30.htm> and the April 1999 documentation of the case of
human rights activist R. Nasraoui provided by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
<http://www.lchr.org/lchr/l2l/nasraouiupd0499.htm>.
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1.2.3) Traditionalist Synthesis II: Saudi-Arabia
According to art. 1 of the Saudi kingdom's "Basic Law of Government/neÛÁm as-siyÁsÐ li 'l-
Îukm" , "God's Book and the Sunnah" are its constitution (dustÙr). I.e. Qur'Án and the aÎ-
ÁdÐth (reported sayings of the prophet)–together commonly considered as the sharÐÝah–hold
a legal status superior to that of the Basic Law-document thus only clarifying the latter. As a
result, the document refers to Islam quite frequently (22 times). The ruling principles are
mainly influenced by orthodox Islamic political theory. Indicators of this are the invocation of
the bayÝa-principle: "citizens pay allegiance to the King" (art.6), shÙrÁ (consultation) as one
of the government principles (art.8), and the state's (and therefore the king's) basis of legiti-
macy as the [supreme, BJT] institution responsible for the protection of Islam, for the imple-
mentation of sharÐÝah and for "ordering the people to do right and shun evil" ('amr bi 'l-maÝrÙf
wa nahy Ýan ‘l-munkar, art.23). 
Besides, the document also contains modern constitutional features like the idea of individ-
ual rights as opposed to the duty-based orthodox notions, cf. nominal reference to human
rights albeit only "in accordance with the Islamic Shari'ah" (art.26), the sacrosanctity of the
private home from intrusion by state authorities (art.27), the prohibition of extra legal pun-
ishment (nulla poena…, art. 38). A third category of constitutional stipulations consists of
hybridisation from both orthodox and Western sources: Since law/feqh may only be derived
from holy law sources/sharÐÝah, there can be no human legislative. Therefore, the three state
authorities consist of the judicial, the executive and one 'regulatory' power. The basic law
foresees no parliament either. Instead, following the consultation principle, the king invites
'whoever he wishes' to the Consultative Council/majlis ash-shÙrÁ and to the Council of Min-
isters (art.68). The function of the former is laid down in art. 15 of the Consultative Council
Establishment Act: 
"[The council] will express opinions on the general policy of the state..., discuss the
general plan of economic and social development... study international laws, char-
ters, treaties and agreements, and concessions and make appropriate suggestions
regarding them. Interpret law... discuss annual reports..."28 
However, in case of conflict between the council's decision and the opinion of the Council of
Ministers the king has the last word on the issue. Accordingly, there are no legal statutes for
the establishment of political or other parties, on the contrary, the idea of plurality is quite
negatively conceived of: "The consolidation of national unity is a duty, and the state will pre-
vent anything that may lead to disunity, sedition and separation." (art.12). However, Saudi
Arabia's current statutory order differs from ancient European monarchies in that it is con-
stitutional. Since Islamic law is–in principle–29supreme to the ruler, it may rather be qualified
as 'nomocracy'.
Both documents, the "Basic Law of Government" and the "Establishment Act of the Consul-
tative Council" are comparatively recent achievements.30 Their proclamation (no referen-
                                                          
28 My emphases.
29 According to the orthodox school of AÎmad ibn Íanbal dominating the law interpetation in the kingdom, the
ruler may temporarily suspend stipulations of Islamic law for the common good, cf. Reissner in Ende/Steinbach
(1996:536).
30 Prior to the foundation of the kingdom, Kind ÝAbd al-AzÐz established a majlis ash-shÙrÁ in 1926. In the first
year, its members were elected albeit not by general suffrage but by the ÝulamÁ', notables and by the merchants.
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dum) by the king in 1992 was preceded by longstanding demands, promises on the side of
king and by two significant challenges to the government's legitimacy: 
? The first serious challenge after the establishment of the kingdom in 1932 was the sei-
zure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979 by the militant ikhwÁn-group which was
considered the "tip of the iceberg" (Dekmejian 1994:628) of the widespread Islamic re-
vivalism which emerged in the 1970ies not only in the Saudi society but also in neigh-
bouring Iran. As platform for expressing diverging opinions on the state of society, Crown
prince Fahd promised to set up a majlis ash-shÙrÁ (Consultative Council) and to write
down the modalities (aÒÁlib) of governance, but a constitutional committee set up in 1980
eventually failed to do so. In order to improve his religious legitimacy, the king formally
assumed the title of the "custodian of the Two Holy Sanctuaries [i.e. Meccah and Medi-
nah, BJT]".
? The second serious challenge to the kingdom's legitimacy was posed by the second Gulf
war. In the face of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the consequent massive de-
ployment of US-military, it became apparent that despite decenncia of horrendous mili-
tary expenditures, Saudi Arabia could not defend its economic basis (oilfields) against
possible aggression from its neighbouring country. Nor could it meet its own assertions
of being able to protect the Holy Sanctuaries–the basis of the kingdom's religio-political
legitimacy. 
It was particularly the latter aspect of the regime's double failure, namely the obvious de-
pendence on foreign military assistance, which gave rise to–so far unknown–31public denun-
ciation from the side of the Islamists: In an unprecedented step, the Islamists in 1991 sub-
mitted a letter to the king32: Top and foremost demand was the "creation of an independent
majlis ash-shÙrÁ with the actual power to determine the domestic and foreign policies of the
country."33 While the power to "determine"34 any government policy clearly exceeds all no-
tions of mere (traditional) shÙrÁ (consultation), the second appeal of the letter appears
somewhat contradictory in the light of the former. Namely, the "elimination of all political,
administrative, and economic laws and regulations that contradict the sharia." Taken to-
gether, the signatories' main idea for coping with plurality consists of upholding the sharÐÝatic
character of the political system in principle, while at the same time democratising the inter-
pretation and implementation of the holy law.
Another challenge to the politico-religious legitimacy of the regime occurred when Islamist
academics–some of them signatories of the 1991 letter of demands–openly attacked the
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Later, they were appointed by the king. Up to 1953, when the first council of ministers was convened it main-
tained a certain importance.
31 Other than the IkhwÁn-militants in the 1970ies, the pre-war Islamist wave enjoyed mass support, according to
Demkejian (1994). However, it restricted its activity–very much like the revolutionary Iranian pasdarân- to public
'virtue watching': "to transform social conduct [homogenising plurality for that matter, BJT] by patrolling the shop-
ping malls, spying on people, and raiding homes in search of 'un-Islamic' conduct" (Dekmejian 1994:66).
32 It was only preceded by the petition of "liberal" intellectuals to the king in December 1990 calling for the codi-
fication of Islamic law, providing for basic human rights, equality before law, a consultative council, and an inde-
pendent judiciary, cf. <http://www.saudhouse.com/petition1.htm>. For the translation of the 1991 risÁlat 'l-ÝulamÁ'
fÐ 's-saÝudiyah ilÁ 'l-Malik al-Fahd cf. the Website of the London based Îarakat 'l-islÁmiya lÐ 'l-islÁÎ (Movement for
Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA) <http://miraserve.com/appendix.html>, for a history of its evolution from the
opposition's point of view <http://www.miraserve.com/chap6.html>.
33 My emphasis.
34 Instead of "determines" the MIRA-version reads "decides".
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fatwÁ (religious legal opinion) of the supreme state ÝÀlim (religious legal scholar), Shaikh
ÝAbd al-ÝAzÐz Ibn al-Baz, sanctioning the presence of the foreign troops in Islam's holy land
during the Gulf war. The regime countered Islamist demands by a strategy that combined
both appeasement and threats but also incremental reform, such as the promulgation of the
1992 NiÛÁm as-siyÁsÐ li 'l-Îukm and the appointment of the conservative ÝÀlim Shaikh
MuÎammad Ibn Jubayr as the chairman of the impending majlis ash-shÙrÁ. In the same ye-
ar–despite their partial victory–the Islamists escalated the confrontation with the regime both
in tone and content with yet another open letter to the king. In this "Memorandum of Ad-
vice",35 the political objective is less equivocal than in the 1991 letter: First and foremost, the
document demands equal rights particularly with respect to the freedom to publish and
preach, for those ÝulamÁ' who do not pertain to the "official class of ÝulamÁ'". However, the
plurality of opinions shall only be legitimate insofar as the limits of sharÐÝah are not trans-
gressed: the establishment of a quasi constitutional–a sharÝÐ (religious legal)–court is to en-
sure the compatibility of all laws, treaties, and regulations with Islam. The fact that in reaction
to the Memorandum nearly half of the senior ("state") ÝulamÁ' declined to sign a denunciation
of it (inspired by Shaikh bin Baz), indicates the existence of a not so marginal support for the
opposition even within the circles of official clerics.36 
A further direct challenge to the Saudi authorities was the foundation of the first Saudi "hu-
man rights" organisation, the lajnah ad-difÁÝ Ýan 'l-huqÙq ash-sharÐÝa (Committee for the De-
fence of Legitimate Rights, CDLR) in 1993 by six prominent Islamists.37 The Saudi regime
reacted promptly by disbanding CDLR and with the arrest of its spokesman MuÎammad al-
MasÝarÐ who left the country clandestinely in 1994 and since then re-established the Com-
mittee in London. Other outspoken critics of the regime remain in detention.38
The conflict about the presence of US-troops escalated with subsequent bomb attacks on
US-facilities in the country. Both, CDRL and its off-spring the Íarakat 'l-islÁmiyah li 'l-islÁÎ
(Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia, MIRA, est. 1996) either condoned the attacks or
expressed "understanding" for the motives of the perpetrators.39
Inside the Saudi political system, the Majlis ash-shÙrÁ which became operative at the end of
1993 has not yet managed to offer a forum for the political opposition, let alone to reconcile
the fundamentally diverging outlooks on the future state of society. This may, among other
                                                          
35 On the background of the memorandum from the opposition's perspective, cf. chapter 9 of "History of Dissent
(New Edition). The story of Islamic dissent in Arabia" <http://www.miraserve.com/chap9.html>.
36 On the other hand, apparently because of the relatively widespread support for the Islamic/Islamist opposition
particularly among recently urbanised Bedouins, the regime denied the liberal modernist/lay secular opposition to
express their objections to the Islamist project, cf. Dekmejian (1994:628, 639).
37 All but one of them were signatories of the 1992 memorandum, cf. the founding declaration on the CDLR
homepage <http://www.ummah.org.uk/cdlr/Com/COMM01.htm>. Note, however, the organisation recognises
human rights only within the realm of Islamic sharÐÝah, therefore its self-inflicted designation as "Committee for
the Defence of Legitimate (in lieu of "Legal") Rights". Consequently, rather than "human rights organisation",
CDLR must–from a Western perspective–be considered as a partisan/political opposition group. Despite the
massive use of modern information technology like facsimiles and the world wide web in particular, the founder
MasÝarÐ himself is rather sceptical with respect to the effect inside the country itself, cf. his interview in The Mid-
dle East Times in 1996, <http://www.metimes.com/cens/c6.htm>.
38 Cf. the case of Shaikh al-Awdah, who ignored two government "no speak injunctions" in 1993 and 1994. De-
spite his imprisonment since then, he continued his outspoken critique in a letter to the King in 1996, cf.
<http://www.saudhouse.com/letter2.htm>.
39 The Committee Against Corruption in Saudi Arabia (C.A.C.S.A.), another–yet seemingly more "secular"–op-
position group entertains a profoundly informative website on the human rights situation and particularly with
regard to the freedom of speech cf. <http://www.saudhouse.com/freedom.htm>. Its backing inside the country is
also difficult to determine, given the fact, that the Saudi government blocks the access to this website for all its
residents.
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factors, be due to its suffering from an outdated "modernising imperative". In a recent inter-
view, the council's chairman Ibn Jubayr maintained: "If we voted under present conditions we
would not obtain the appropriate representatives."40 He explained, since Saudi society was
still primarily tribally structured, people would not vote for the technocrats who currently pre-
sent the majority of the majlis' members,41 but for their respective tribal chiefs.42
Therefore, this majlis is structurally unable to resonate interests or opinions of Saudi society
as a whole, but only those of some "chosen" political élite (although formally no member of
the ruling family pertains to its members). Given the additional serious restrictions of the
freedom of expression,43 any opinion diverging from the official discourse is considered ille-
gitimate per se.
The concept of shÙrÁ, is very prominent in various theoretical elaborations of contemporary
Muslim political reformism. This will be discussed in the following part of the paper, together
with another specifically Saudi tool of managing plurality, that of naÒÐÎah/"sincere advice".
1.2.4) A Modernist Synthesis: Iran
As the country's official name JumhÙrÐ-ye IslÁmÐ/"Islamic Republic" indicates, Iran's current
constitutional system is based both on Western republican thought and at the same time on
specifically ShÐÝi doctrines of Islamic government. Compared both to other political systems
mentioned in this study and to other Middle Eastern countries in general, the Iranian political
system was the one to undergo the strongest formal transformations since the 1979 revolu-
tion
By way of resort to Iran's pre-Islamic dynasties of Sasanides and Achaemenides, the ShÁh
of Persia–particularly toward the end of his reign in the 1970s–had tried to transform the
country's character from an Islamic one to an 'authentically' Iranian one. The process of
secularisation by reducing the relatively strong influence of the religious authorities in Iranian
society and by shattering their independent standing vs. the state had set in much earlier,
however.44 
                                                          
40 Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, January 5th, 1999. Although ÓalÁl Bin ÝAbd al-AzÐz as-SaÝÙd, half-brother
of King Fahd, urged the government to eventually hold "real" elections, he also thought the people not yet mature
enough for such a step: "I don't believe we are ready. The Arab countries that have elections, do you think they
have real parliaments?" in: The Middle East Times, March 15th, 1998 <http://metimes.com/issue98-
11/reg/talal.htm>.
41 For listings of past and current majlis members, and biographies of its chief executives cf. the homepage of
the Saudi embassy in the US <http://www.saudiembassy.net/gov_profile/consult.html>.
42 Far from being a rigid structure, the tribes in Saudi Arabia have exhibited a significant capacity for adaptation
to changing social conditions while maintaining the old symbols of religious cohesiveness, cf. Nehme (1995:45).
43 According to the Freedom House Special Report to the 55th Session of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights in Geneva, 1999, Saudi-Arabia scored among the 13 'Most repressive Regimes of 1998'
(http://freedomhouse.org/worst98/sudan.html). Even the otherwise "friendly" US-State Dept. 'Report on Human
Rights Practices for 1998, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999'
reads in Sect. 2.a: " The [Saudi, BJT] Government severely limits freedom of speech and the press. The authori-
ties do not countenance criticism of Islam, the ruling family, or the Government… Persons whose criticisms align
them with an organized political opposition are subject to arrest and detention until they confess to a crime or
sign a statement promising not to resume such criticisms, which is tantamount to a confession"
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/saudiara.html>.
44 While from a purely religious perspective Iranian-ShÐÝi mullÁ's carry the same functions as their counterparts in
the SunnÐ world, the ÝulamÁ' (Halm 1994:103f), only the former may with some justification be conceived of as a
clergy, in that they form a strongly (however informally) hierarchised group, distinct from the rest of society.
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From early secularisation to popular revolution (I)
While profane power/government in the SunnÐ political tradition usually sought support, i.e.
religious legitimacy from the (dependent) ÝulamÁ',45 ShÐÝi clerics in Iran had managed to re-
tain a relatively strong independence from, and yet mostly disinterested stance toward the
state and its policies.46 This exceptional structural antagonism may even be regarded as a
secularisation in an embryonic stage, a potential point of leverage toward the differentiation
of spheres of power.47 In the long run, this antagonism led to conflicts more than once. It
came about that some influential clerics, being mainly concerned with keeping their inde-
pendence, sided with the nationalists against the monarchy that was regularly bowing to for-
eign powers (tobacco protest 1891). For the same reason, some had even sided with the
liberal national movement for a constitution (mashrÙÔiyat 1905-11). This move is noteworthy,
since it confronted the clerics with a dilemma that still persists today. The constitutional
movement's main thrust was in principle unacceptable since the establishment of a sover-
eignty that solely rested in the people would not only divest the traditional agency (the king)
of power, but also the 'final', i.e. divine sovereign. At the time, the question was deliberately
left unsettled. Instead, the compromise that was eventually included in the supplement to the
1906 Constitution acknowledged both sovereignties: While the people were empowered to
make laws, the final sovereignty still rested in Islamic law, in principle. Operationally, the
ÝulamÁ' were entitled to revise profane legislation in the light of divine revelation.48 This
stipulation, like the rest of the constitution became inoperative with the dissolution of the par-
liament in 1911. However, despite the continuous establishment of secular schools in lieu of
the traditional religious madrasahs from the beginning of the century onwards, despite the
fact that the latter nominally acceded to the control of the state, and even after most notarial
services had been taken over by state authorities from the ÝulamÁ', the clergy's authority on
religious life proper remained largely intact. After ReÃÁ KhÁn had established the Pahlavi-
Dynasty in 1925, based on the vote of a constituent assembly and with the support of the
majority of mullÁs, he carried out his reform programs with large parliamentary support.
However, after his ascent of the ShÁh's throne, parliament lost its influence and its members
                                                          
45 Both colonial and post-colonial regimes in Morocco and Tunisia (likewise Turkey and Egypt) rather incorpo-
rated than banned the religious institutions–religion as such (religion de l'Etat)- and usurped its functions (educa-
tion, judiciary). As Keddie (1988:14) rightly contends with respect to the Middle Eastern context: 'Secularism in
the case of early to mid-20th century modernisation meant the occupation of the ÝulamÁ' by the authority of the
state." The potentially fruitful starting point for a major differentiation between the state and ÝulamÁ' in pre-colonial
times was thus neglected.
46 All profane rule is held to be illegitimate–th us only provisory until the advent of the mahdÐ , the 12th imÁm
(descendant of the prophet MuÎammad and his son in law, ÝAlÐ), resting in occultation since 941 AD) according to
traditional ShÐÝi conviction (Halm 1994). Except for specific issues in which the mullâs became politically active,
up to the 1960s participation in political life was an anathema (Amirpur 1997:539f). Still today, most of the top
ÝulamÁ', the ayatullÁh al-uÛmÁs, are strictly disinterested in participating at political power, if not in outright oppo-
sition to the Post-KhumaynÐ-regime, like AyÁtullÁh MuntaÛerÐ. Popular philosopher ÝAbd al-KarÐm SurÙsh, who is
himself not a cleric, heavily criticises the current role of the ÝulamÁ' in politics because of their incompetence with
respect to other sources of knowledge other than religious ones. On SurÙsh's political thought cf. Vakili (1997),
on the religious educational system cf. Amirpur (1997) and Mottahedeh (1985).
47 The traditional institutions of religious authority that had become independent from the state in the 18th cen-
tury survived, so did the possibility of withholding legitimacy not primarily from the constitutional order as the
system of public authority as Arjomand (1993:43) suggests, but from any institution of secular power.
48 Art. 2 of the 1907 constitutional annex may thus be regarded a precursor to the 1979 constitution's art. 91 on
the functions of the shÙrÁ-ye negahbÁn/'Guardian Council'.
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were hand-picked.49 The constitution was manipulated and its Islamic provisions were ig-
nored.50
With the accession to power of MuÎammad ReÃÁ in 1941, clerics participated more in politi-
cal life than before, particularly in cases where the protection of national resources were in-
volved and where the clerics own interests were affected by the Shah's policies. An example
for the former was the conflict over Prime Minister MuÎammad MuÒaddeq's policy of nation-
alising the oil industry. He was eventually ousted and the Shah re-instituted by the US-
incited Coup d'état in 1953. 
An example of the latter was Shah's land reform in 1963 as a part of a larger reform package
(EnqelÁb-e sefÐd, "white revolution"). The land reform would have undermined the economic
basis of the clergy's independence, that rested mainly in the wealthy endowment trusts
(awqÁf). The rally of religious students against the Shah's plans was violently suppressed. In
the course of these events and later against the growing influence of the US, one cleric in
particular, AyÁtullÁh KhumaynÐ, gained profile by opposing the Shah even personally. Exiled
in 1965, KhumaynÐ was soon to propagate the political concept of velÁyat-e faqÐh/The Trus-
teeship of the Islamic Jurist, (1970).51 This concept filled the theoretical gap between the
generally quietist stance of the clergy and the substitution by a more activist stance toward
national policies since the early 1960s. 
The Shah had not only quelled the clergy's opposition. After the 1953 Coup d'état, the noto-
rious secret police SAVAK was established mainly as an instrument for oppressing the in-
creasing leftist opposition. 
The origins and the objectives of the revolutionary movement starting in the mid-1970s are
manifold. However, in the face of the political system deteriorating into a 'Monarcho-
Dictatorship" (Behrawan 1980) the primary objective of the revolutionary movement was the
establishment of human and civil rights. The two party-system that had once been intro-
duced as a concession to the US, was transformed to unity party in 1975. Like the nominal
two party-system before, it proved incapable to channel the political opposition. Secular
groups like ShÁhpÙr BakhtiyÁr's National Front or moderately Islamic groups like MehdÐ
BÁzargÁn's Freedom Movement had an important share in bringing about the end of the
Shah's reign. However, solely KhumaynÐ's charismatic personality was able to merge the
very diverse fractions of the revolutionary movement. Eventually, after the fall of the ShÁh
and the BakhtiyÁr interim government, KhumaynÐ and his followers from the clergy emerged
as the strongest group in the inter-factional quarrels for power. 
Between 'Republic' and 'Trusteeship of the Jurist'
Contrary to what might have been expected then, the new rulers did not at first seek to erect
a genuinely Islamic system of Caliphate or the specifically ShÐÝi ImÁmate. The first draft of
the new constitution leaned heavily on the 1906 text and on the Gaullist French constitution,
                                                          
49 Like many other rulers in the Muslim world, ReÃÁ ShÁh was inspired by the secularist project of Mustafa
Kemal in Turkey. Like him, he embarked on "modernising" society by the most superficial of means, like making
European clothing obligatory for men (1929) and by prohibiting the traditional veil of women (1936). By forcing
the ShÐÝi ÝulamÁ' to continue wearing their traditional clothing in contrast to the rest of the population and by
obliging them to undergo a state examination ShÁh ReÃÁ eventually accomplished their transformation into a
hierocracy, cf. Halm (1994:141). Rather early, however, the Shah had departed from the republican idea and
sought support i.e. religious legitimacy, from the ÝulamÁ', instead, cf. Steinbach (Ende/Steinbach 1996:248).
50 Cf. Arjomand (1993:23).
51 The original text leaves open whether a single person or several jurists are entitled to leadership, cf. Halm
(1994:159).
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it lacked all explicit and implicit reference to velayÁt-e faqÐh. However, after the first referen-
dum produced an overwhelming popular mandate for the establishment of an 'Islamic Re-
public', the plans for a broad constitutional assembly were given up in favour of an elected
'expert assembly',52 mostly consisting of clerics who were dissatisfied with the secular char-
acter of the draft. The assembly modified the draft in crucial aspects concerning the role of
Islamic law and that of the Islamic jurists/fuqahÁ. The final version did not resemble the
original draft very much any more:
? A moderate form of the velayÁt-e faqÐh, i.e. the supreme trusteeship of the Revolutionary
Leader (raÎbar) was now–if only implicitly–introduced by art. 5: "During the Occultation of
the Wali al-Asr (may God hasten his reappearance), the wilayah and leadership of the
Ummah devolve upon the just ('adil) and pious (muttaqi) faqih…"53 While his powers laid
down in art. 110 clearly exceed mere supervision over the three branches of govern-
ment, he is not allotted the plenipotentiary role of KhumaynÐ's 1970 velayÁt-e faqÐh-
concept.
? Conversely to the 1906 constitution and to the draft, the Leader of the Revolution–ac-
knowledged by the majority of the population–was expected to meet the highest of all
possible religious qualifications54 whereas the draft constitution had not even properly
differentiated this post from that of the presidency. The importance of the religious jurists
in general is further stressed by the fundamental principles of the Islamic system as laid
down in art. 2, which–in order to adapt rigid sharÐÝah-stipulations to the modern times–
prescribes "continual ijtihÁd/[individual strife for a just solution/ruling] by qualified jurists." 
? For the first time in the constitutional history of Iran, the principal division of powers into
legislative, executive, and judicature was established at least formally. One major objec-
tive of the revolutionary movement was accomplished with the establishment of the fun-
damental human and political rights. All those were granted, however, only within the
limits of Islamic law. art. 24, for example, grants the freedom of the press, art. 26 the
freedom of association–both under the condition that they do not harm "fundamental
principles of Islam".
Art. 12 also establishes Islam and the JaÝafarite law school as the official religion of the state.
Furthermore, the constitution provides that only religious experts or rather fuqahÁ/religious
jurists in particular, are eligible to fill important functions of the state. However, while the
sovereignty of the people is, in principle, only conferred and God only delegates the right to
rule (art. 56), it is the people, not the fuqahÁ, who are entitled to exercise this right. Opera-
tionally, sovereignty is exercised by the popularly elected Consultative Assembly/majlis-e
shÙrÁ. The relative strength of the parliament is indicated by the fact that the constitution
does not provide for any procedures to dissolve it. The majlis' legislation is, however, over-
looked and–if deemed–vetoed, by the Guardian Council/shÙrÁ-ye negahbÁn, consisting of 12
jurists.55
                                                          
52 On the unfair election process, cf. Schirazi (1997:31f).
53 Cit. from the Iranian government website
<http://www.salamiran.org/IranInfo/State/Constitution/articles/a005.html>. Unless otherwise indicated, all further
references to the constitution are quoted from this site.
54 That of marja' 't-taqlÐd/source of inspiration, cf. Halm (1994:133-37).
55 While only half of the members have to qualify as faqÐh, they alone decide on the conformity of secular law
with the sharÐÝah.
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Regardless of the fact that the new constitution vindicated the distinction between laymen
and clerics, it was also approved by popular referendum. Soon after the new regime's firm
establishment, however, it was confronted with opposition from ethnic groups whose long-
standing demands regarding autonomy and/or acknowledgement of cultural distinction
(Kurds, Azeri, Baloch) were denied despite the latter's active support in the overthrow of the
Shah. By methods similar to those of the late ShÁh (detention, torture, extra-judicial execu-
tion by secret police) and sometimes even more extreme measures (mass executions) the
revolutionary regime pitilessly suppressed and thus forced outside the country opposition
groups of all deviant ideological orientations, such as monarchists, democrats, moderate
Islamists, and communists. The human rights situation further deteriorated on the back-
ground of Gulf-War I, starting with Iraq's attack in 1980 and ending only in 1988. The free-
dom of association and freedom of the press granted in arts. 26 and 24 of the constitution
notwithstanding, all non-Islamic organisations, groups, and parties were successively pro-
hibited, as were their respective press organs.56 However, a unitary party–founded by the
regime as an alternative platform for channelling dissatisfaction with the government, the
Islamic Republican Party (IRP)–proved largely ineffective, and thus dissolved itself voluntar-
ily in 1987. 
At the end of the Gulf-War, relieved from external pressure, severe factional antagonisms
erupted openly inside government and parliament between rather dogmatically orientated
clerics on the one side and more pragmatically orientated ones on the other.57
Based on the constitutional arrangement of a double-headed executive branch (president
and Leader of the Revolution), and given both KhumaynÐ's unquestionable reputation as
excellent jurist of religious law and his charismatic qualities, he concentrated much more de
facto-power in his hands than the constitution formally assigned to him. By way of giving
fatwÁs/legal opinions, he publicly answered questions addressed to him by various state
agencies and quarrelling power fractions within the state.58 Albeit on an abstract level of
constitutional theory which left space for further debate and elaboration by the pertinent
agencies, KhumaynÐ nevertheless laid out the policy-outlines for the most important social,
economic, and political questions. 
From raison d'état to "popular revolution II" ?
One of KhumaynÐ's strongest statements addressed the ever more pressing problem of pre-
serving the consistency of parliament's legislation with sharÐÝah-law. Crucial legislative proj-
ects had been blocked by the competition between majlis and shÙrÁ-ye negahbÁn. In 1988
KhumaynÐ decreed "what is in the interest (maÒlaÎat) of maintaining [the ruling] order" was
the "most important of God's ordinances (aÎkÁm-e elÁhÐ)" and stood above "all ordinances
that were derived or directly commanded by Allah".59 KhumaynÐ himself appointed an extra-
                                                          
56 Cf. Schirazi (1997:124-50). Most of the nearly 100 political organisations that emerged between 1979 and
1981 had been declared illegal, cf. Fairbanks (1998:21).
57 More specifically, from the very beginning the antagonism inside the successive revolutionary governments
had persisted between those aiming at a radical Islamisation of the state in the cultural and judicial sphere while
objecting to social and economic transformation of society (Îujjatiye) on the one side, and groups propagating
just the opposite (maktabÐ), on the other side. The principles clashed particularly in the majlis, thereby blocking
important legislative projects, cf. Steinbach in Ende/Steinbach (1996:262).
58 Cf. Gholamasad (1999:32-36) on the constitutional foundations of KhumaynÐ's charismatic leadership.
59 Cited from Schirazi (1997:64). According to the author, this fatwÁ merely sanctioned the much earlier refer-
ences made to maÒlaÎat. Particularly in legislation concerning economic, and in particular fiscal/taxation-matters,
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constitutional body designed to mediate between majlis and the Guardian Council. De facto,
however, this majmaÝ-e tashkhÐÒ-e maÒlaÎat-e neÛÁm/"Assembly for the Assessment of the
Interest of the System"60 became a third legislative body.
In order to smoothen the legislative process and also aiming to strengthen the president at
the expense of the raÎbar, the constitution was revised to take its current form in 1989. Due
to the problem that no properly qualified Ýálim/religious scholar was interested in taking the
post of raÎbar after the foreseeable demise of KhumaynÐ, the latter consented to ceding
power to the president, thereby making the president/ra'Ðs the indisputable head of the ex-
ecutive.61 Additionally, the formal requirements for the post of raÎbar were lowered, such
that the future Leader of the Revolution did not have to meet the qualification of marja' t-
taqlÐd. Furthermore, while the majmaÝ-e tashkhÐÒ was given a constitutional foundation (art.
112) it was formally stripped of its power to frame legislation in circumvention of the original
agencies, majlis and shÙrÁ-ye negahbÁn. Mirroring the modifications of the executive
branch, the judiciary was also given a single head. 
Likewise due to the ending of the war and because of strong pressure from the majlis, the
implementation of the law on the registration of political parties/associations could no longer
be postponed. Within two weeks of the official registration period in the beginning of 1989,
28 groups applied for recognition by the interior ministry. However, whether or not they were
granted this recognition, did not matter much in political practice.62 Although several groups
functioned as quasi-parties in the 1992 and 1996 majlis-elections, and organisational support
was given to the candidates in the 1997 presidential elections, political parties were still no
reality. President RafsanjÁnÐ's announcement in early 1997, that he favoured party forma-
tion, taÎazzub, was ambiguous since he alluded to KhumaynÐ's interpretation which had re-
ferred to the formation of a single unity party only. In contrast, AyÁtullÁh MuÎammad
KhÁtamÐ had–however cautiously–approved pluralism of parties before the presidential elec-
tions. After he replaced RafsanjÁnÐ after a landslide victory in 1997, he successively accom-
plished the (re)-introduction of the concept of an "(Islamic) civil society/jÁmeÝe-ye maddanÐ"
not only into the public Iranian political discourse63 but also propagated it on international
Muslim forums like the Organisation of Islamic Conference.64 While Iranian intellectuals and
authors like HÙshang GulshirÐ, ÝAbbÁs MaÝarÙfÐ, or Faraj SarkÙhÐ hailed the advent of the
"liberal" president, and despite KhÁtamÐ's frequent appeals to the freedom of the press, po-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
parliament had referred to maÒlaÎat as early as 1980, cf. Schirazi (1997:237-47). Cf. Reissner (1988:214) with a
different translation of the fatwÁ and on problems of judicial terminology and semantics (223-26).
60 The official English translation is 'Expediency Council' while Schirazi (1997:234f) translates 'Assessment
Council'.
61 However, through a system of commissioners–all of them clerics and directly responsible to the raÎbar–the
current Leader of the Revolution, AyÁtullÁh KhÁmene'Ð, like his predecessor, KhumaynÐ, is able to exert indeter-
minable influence in all major ministries and state agencies, including the armed forces, religious and revolution-
ary organisations, and provincial authorities, cf. Buchta (1998:56-60).
62 Fairbanks (1998:22) quotes groups that were able to participate in the majlis-election without being permitted
to, others were permitted, but they failed to be politically active.
63 Conversely to KhumaynÐ, KhÁtamÐ is positively impressed by Western liberalist political theory, cf. his treatise
Az dunyÁ-ye shahr tÁ shahr-e dunyÁ: sayrÐ dar andÐsheh-ye siyÁsÐ-ye gharb/From the World of the City to the
City of the World: A Survey of Western Political Thought. For a review of the book and on KhÁtamÐ's intellectual
background cf. Bakhash, Sh: The Unlikely President, in The New York Review of Books, Nov. 5th, 1998
<http://www.nybooks.com/nyrev/WWWarchdisplay.cgi?19981105047R>. On the concept of civil society and its
cultural foundations in the Iranian context, cf. e.g. the contribution of ÍashmatullÁh ÓabarzadÐ in MehregÁn, vol. 7
(1998) no. 2 <http://www.ig-dc.com/mehregan/126-01.htm>. For a detailed overview on the civil society debate,
cf. Schirazi (1998).
64 Cf. KhÁtamÐ's address to the 8th Session of the Islamic Summit Conference 1997
<http://www.undp.org/missions/iran/new008.html>.
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litical development and inter- civilisational dialogue in the Iranian public,65 in international
conferences, and media,66 as of mid-1999, the political discourse is still heavily engaged in
negotiating (and sometimes violently struggling with) the
"...fundamental distinction between a hierocratic elite, defined by their formal qualifi-
cations as jurists… and the lay citizens, with the eligibility for Leadership, Headship of
the Judiciary Power, membership in the Assembly of Experts, and the six conse-
quential positions in the Council of Guardians…"67
Despite the fact that this fundamental discussion took full swing only two years ago, at least
four informal political groupings are discernible within the whole of the political apparatus (i.e.
they are operative in all of its branches and on different levels of administration). They may
be grouped according to their respective stance toward the two foci of discussion that
emerged from the larger problematique, namely
? whether the raÎbar is subject to the constitution and to the will of the people or not, 
? political pluralism in general, i.e. the establishment of political parties, the freedom of
expression, etc.68 
Two of the groupings approve of a more liberal stance toward both issues:
? The rÁst-e mudern/"Modern Right", mainly technocrats represented by the kÁrguzÁrÁn-e
sÁzandegÐ-organisation and the capital's former mayor, GhulÁm-Íusayn KarbÁstchÐ.69
? Since only recently, the tchÁp-e islÁmÐ/"Islamic Left" that includes organisations like the
majmaÝ-ye rÙÎÁniyÙn-e mubÁrez under its leader M. KarrÙbÐ and the sÁzemÁn-e mu-
jÁhedÐn-e enqelÁb-e islÁmÐ under. B. NabavÐ.
Two other groupings decidedly oppose the former:
? Tchap-e jadÐd/"New Left", represented by the jÁmeÝe defÁÝ-ye az arzeshhÁ-ye enqelÁb-e
islÁmÐ with its leader M. Ray-ShahrÐ and
? RÁst-e sunnatÐ/"Traditionalist Right" including the jÁmeÝe-ye rÙÎÁniyat-e mÙbÁrez, repre-
sented by the 1997 presidential candidate M. Náteq-NÙrÐ and others.70
Only recently, the current Revolutionary Leader, AyatullÁh KhÁmene'Ð himself made a con-
ciliatory move with regard to the 'Irreconcilable Entities'71 and toward the affirmation of a
Rechtsstaat by declaring all Iranians–explicitly including the valÐ-ye faqÐh–as subject to the
                                                          
65 Cf. his critique on restrictions on personal freedom and freedom of expression in the name of Islam as coun-
terproductive to their very target, namely to 'social cohesion/waÎdat-e mellat'. While in principle upholding Islamic
values and explicitly juxtaposing 'Western' secular societies and 'religious societies' like Iran, KhÁtamÐ fears that
particularly the Iranian youth will be alienated from the spiritual dimensions of Islam if the latter is instrumental-
ised for purely political purposes, cf. his speech reported in the periodical ÓÙs August 27th, 1998
<www.persia.org/khatami/tous27aug.html>. Contrary to the rigorous refutation of "Western civilisation" by Khu-
maynÐ and his successor KhÁmene'Ð and other intellectuals, KhÁtamÐ proposes the year 2001 as the year for a
universal dialogue of civilisations/guftegÙ-ye tamaddunhÁ, cf. his speech before the UN-General Assembly on
September 21st, 1998 <http://www.gov.ir/year2001/khatamiun.htm>.
66 Cf. his contribution to the Arabic weekly al-Alam (London) on March 15th and 22nd 1997, the transcript of an
interview with CNN on January 7th, 1998, <http://www.un.int/iran/statements/other/other007.html>, and his exclu-
sive contributions in the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on August 8th and September 26th, 1998.
67 Arjomand (1993:40f).
68 This fundamental question on the final sovereignty, i.e. who is in charge, is not free of content. It may be re-
garded as a culmination of the antagonism between Îujjatiye and maktabÐ, referred to above, cf. fn. 56.
69 The latter is editor-in-chief of the daily HamshahrÐ, <http://www.neda.net/hamshahri>. The dailies ÝEÔÔelÁÝÁt
<http://194.217.65.51/Gha/HomeEdition/index.htm> and IrÁn <http://www.iran-newspaper.com> also pertain to
rÁst-e mudern.
70 For a more detailed account of these groupings, cf. Buchta (1998:46-52).
71 Cf. ReÃÁ TcherandÁbÐ's 'jumhÙriyat' wa 'velÁyat' ÁshtaÐ-ye nÁpadhÐand/"'Republic' and 'Velayat'–Irreconcilable
Entities" in MehregÁn vol. 7 (Fall 1998/1999) no. 3+4 <http://www.ig-dc.com/mehregan/134-01.htm>
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law.72 The authority of the clerics was recently further eroded with regard to their initial
power of denying 'un-Islamic' individuals the right be nominated in elections. The modus op-
erandi for the latest (1999) communal elections foresaw the prospective candidates to sub-
ject themselves only formally, i.e. in a written declaration to the authority of the valÐ. In re-
turn, no cleric was to judge their attitude 'Islamic' or 'un-Islamic'.73
While the groups mentioned above also enjoy popular support, particularly as they represent
the organisational infrastructure for elections, they are nevertheless mainly operative within
the formal branches of the state i.e. executive, legislative, and the judiciary, as well as in the
informal spheres of power (e.g. endowment trusts).
Apart from those groupings, some nuclei of an arguably "Islamic (non-secular, for that mat-
ter) civil society" are discernible. This semi-religious opposition of lay-reformers and quietist
clerics operates at the brink of the political system and society:74 
? NahÃat-e ÁzÁdÐ-ye IrÁn/Iranian Freedom Movement, going back to the AyÁtollÁh ÓÁle-
qÁnÐ and M. BÁzargÁn, today represented by IbraÎÐm YazdÐ. They are considered loyal to
the constitution while opposing the principle of velayÁt-e faqÐh.75
? The group around ÝEzattullÁh SahÁbÐ, and its publication IrÁn-e fardÁ76 claiming an Is-
lamic social democracy for Iran.
? A group of religious-intellectual reformers publishing in the KiyÁn-journal,77 among the
most prominent figures is the philosopher ÝAbd al-KarÐm SurÙsh, who will be dealt with in
the second part of the paper.
? The quietist clerics among whom are some of the highest religious qualifications
(AyÁtollÁh ÓÁbÁÔÁbÁÝÐ-QumÐ, Ñádeq RÙÎÁnÐ, MuÎammad ShÐrÁzÐ) have already been
mentioned above as being mostly disinterested in aspiring to profane power.
? Followers of AyÁtullÁh MuntaÛerÐ, who had evolved from a close partisan of KhumaynÐ to
an outspoken critic of the government's policy. He was thus dismissed as the designated
follower of the raÎbar, despite the fact that his religious qualifications did meet the con-
stitutional requirements–in contrast to Khamene'i's. Supporting the formation of political
parties, he praised KhÁtamÐ's election as an enqelÁb-e mardumÐ /"popular revolution".78
                                                          
72 Cf. his address to students at Tarbiyat Mudarres University, Tehran, September 3rd, 1998, English version on
the website of the Ministry of P. T. T. Data Communication of Iran
<http://www.iranpac.net.ir/dci/pagehtm/rahbar.html> (inoperative at the time of print).
73 Neue Zürcher Zeitung April 13th, 1999 .
74 For more detailed accounts of these groups, cf. Buchta (1998:76-82).
75 Cf. their website and periodical <http://www.nehzateazadi.org>. On ÓÁleqÁnÐ cf. recently Vakily 1998.
76 Cf. <http://www.angelfire.com/ok2/gooya3/farda49.html>.
77 Cf. <http://www.angelfire.com/ok2/gooya4/kiyan.html>. On the journal as a forum for the so called rÙshanfekr-
e dÐnÐ/"religious enlightenment", cf. Orient (Hamburg) vol. 38 (1998) no. 1, p. 29-40.
78 In a letter to the president, he also declared: "TashkÐl aÎzÁb-e siyÁsÐ bÁyad ÁzÁd bÁshad/the formation of
parties has to be free" <http://www.iranian.com/Opinion/June97/Montazeri/Page1.shtml>.
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(Re-)secularisation: toward Bureaucratisation and Rule of law
With regard to the differentiation of spheres of power, the Iranian political system is the case
to undergo all stages from an 'embryonic secularism' in the beginning of the century, to an
anti-religious Iranian nationalism of the late ShÁh, ending up in the rule of the clerics after
the 1979 revolution. 
Apparently, the 'fundamentalist roll-back' succeeded in 'Islamising' most spheres of law by
subjecting all profane law to the revealed sharÐÝah. While this is theoretically true, an alterna-
tive reading of what actually happened is equally conceivable: By a series of institutional and
procedural innovations, the ÝulamÁ' from the very beginning of religious rule have proceeded
from mere extraction of law (from revelation) to outright legislation.79 Furthermore, by con-
firming or, at least by not disapproving most of majlis'-legislation, which covers practically all
spheres of everyday life, parliament's essentially profane legislation now carries the label 'in
accordance with sharÐÝah', and can thus claim religious legitimacy.80 In reality, this means
that enormous amounts of secular legal material has been assimilated by ShÐÝi canonical
law.81 
The principle of velayÁt-e faqÐh/"Trusteeship of the Jurist", a pivotal feature that violated the
republican division of power and thus made the Iranian constitution only "semi-secular", must
be considered to be defused by the de facto implications of the 1989 constitutional revision: 
"The constitutional amendments of 1989 completed the translation of the Mandate
[otherwise translated as: Trusteeship, BJT] of the Jurist into the constitutional law of
the bureaucratic state by compartmentalizing, conciliarizing and bureaucratizing it.
The result is a triumph not only for conciliar clericalism but also for the state… which
Khomeyni initially intended to wither… [The state] has emerged as the unintended
victor of the Islamic revolution, making its clerical masters also slaves to its logic."82
This logic is in essence one of successively submitting all state powers to proper (profane)
legislative control. This trend toward the establishment of the rule of law is actively–and ap-
parently not solely for strategic reasons–propagated by the current president KhÁtamÐ.83
Only recently he upheld the majlis' right to run an impeachment procedure even against one
of his closest supporters, the Minister for Culture and Islamic Guidance, AyÁtullÁh Muha-
jerÁnÐ.84
                                                          
79 For the circumvention of sharÐÝah by qÁ'edeh-ye ÃarÙrÁt/emergency rule (e.g. laws on: urban land, land re-
form, rent, domestic and foreign trade, and speculation), sharÔ-e Ãemn-e Ýaqd/"binding secondary contractual
conditions" (e.g. labour law, marriage and divorce law), and aÎkÁm-e ÎukÙmatÐ/state ordinances modifying
sharÐÝah's penal law (including punishments that are regarded as fixed by sharÐÝah, namely the ÎudÙd!), cf. Schi-
razi (1997:173-232).
80 It is noteworthy that in only about half of the few cases in which the shÙrÁ-ye negahbÁn incriminated legisla-
tive bills at all, it was with reference to sharÐÝah. All other bills were reprimanded on the grounds that they violated
the constitution, cf. Schirazi (1997:171).
81 Arjomand (1993:47), Schirazi (1997:161-74).
82 Arjomand (1993:48), my emphases. Cf. similarly Gholamasad (1999:27-38) on KhumaynÐst charismatic lead-
ership shifting from traditionalist rule to legalisation of government.
83 "No one should consider himself above the law and try to impose his views on others… Our objective is to
bring everything within the framework of law… we spare no effort to institutionalize the rule of law", cf. transcript
of a CNN-interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami (1998)
<http://www.un.int/iran/statements/other/other007.html>.
84 "It is the right of the majlis to impeach, investigate and pass suitable legislation in the interest of the people
and society," in: ÝEÔÔelÁÝÁt (bayn al-mellalÐ/International edition) April 23rd, 1999.
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Accommodation of plurality: Grounds for optimism?
Since KhÁtamÐ's election in 1997, the relatively high degree of political plurality, to an extent
that was previously visible mainly within the majlis, is now reflected within the larger Iranian
political system. In contrast to the Tunisian, Moroccan, and in particular to the Saudi case,
this plurality is manifest in the existence of quasi-political parties, representing substantially
different political agendas and competing for power inside the political system, and outside,
in the civil sphere. In some instances, pluralism of this kind is either (partially or periodically)
endorsed by the state or, the endorsement is renounced. In most instances, however, publi-
cations, group/party formation etc. are neither legally approved nor disapproved, but de facto
remain unsuppressed. Thus, a widespread uncertainty persists both in the civil sphere and in
the state itself as to the extent of plurality that is legally permitted or tolerated by the various
agencies of the state. 
It is clear, however, that explicitly secularist agendas (e.g. denial of Islam as a state religion)
run counter to the constitution and will therefore remain unacceptable to any government for
the foreseeable future.
Still, violations of basic civil rights continue to occur particularly in the realm of the freedom
of the press.85 More severely, serial assassinations of intellectuals since late 1998 or inci-
dents like the attack on Tehran University students in July 1999, due to the competition be-
tween the various power centres within the political apparatus, human rights violations can-
not be properly attributed to either one of the state agencies. This renders a criminal prose-
cution of these cases an intricate political action.86 Unquestionably serious is the human
rights situation with respect to ethnic (Kurds) and religious minorities, especially the BahaÐ'-
denomination which is considered apostate from Muslim faith.87
1.2.5) In sum: Different degrees of secularisation–similar deficiencies: participation,
free speech, and human rights in legal reality
The brief empirical overview on different constitutional systems and their respective reality
has validated the hypothesis that–regardless of the sytems' 'secular' or 'semi-secular' legal
character–the factual accommodation of plurality is far from satisfying in either one of the
four cases. 
Taboo issues: In all cases, regimes have persistently refused or still refuse to respond to or
outright suppress the public discourse on fundamental political issues: 
? extra-constitutional status of the king and state religion in Morocco
? similarly the "Pratique religieuse dans l'état, ni au-dessus, ni contre, ni à coté" in Tunisia
? veritable political participation of the majlis ash-shÙrÁ/consultative council in Saudi-
Arabia,
                                                          
85 Cf. the repetitious prohibition of the ÓÙs (formerly: JÁmeÝe-)journal. Cf. also the recent letter of more than 320
journalists to the president demanding safety against "possible injuries inflicted by institutions of power and other
agencies every once in a while…" cf. IRNA-newsagency April 17th, 1999.
86 Cf. the pro-KhÁtamÐ Iran Daily of July 19th, 1999: "...pressure groups were mainly involved in both the sabo-
tage and attacks on students... [they] do not have any legal orientation and do not take orders from any of the
government officials..."
87 Cf. the Iran Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Hu-
man Rights, and Labor, February 26, 1999
<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/iran.html>.
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? constitutional status of the raÎbar-e enqelÁb/Leader of the revolution in Iran.
Violation of civil and human rights: In all cases, opposition referring to the above men-
tioned taboos is either suppressed and forced into internal retreat or exile. 
In order to suppress the above mentioned issues and the respective political opposition ef-
fectively, all regimes utilise means that violate not 'only' civil, but at times even basic human
rights. 
In country rankings with respect to the occurrence of human and civil rights violations from
1972 until today, only Morocco can be considered as a 'partially free' political system for the
whole period, Tunisia from 1979 until 1993 (the remainder 'not free'). Iran is considered 'not
free' with the exception of the post-revolutionary period from 1984-88 (partly free), Saudi-
Arabia is scaled 'not free' for the whole term.88 If–contrary to the working hypothesis- suc-
cessful accommodation of plurality was indeed dependent on the degree of secularisation
(counter-hypothesis), Tunisia, in lieu of Morocco would be expected to fare best among all
cases, which is not the case.
From this follows that the pivotal task of accommodating plurality has not successfully been
achieved by the existing models of political organisation. It is thus justified to investigate
projects that are aimed at improving the current malaise.
Most authors the paper refers to originate from the Muslim world. However, for the lack of
freedom of expression in their own societies many chose to live elsewhere. Having experi-
enced more or less massive repression for expressing their views their proposals usually do
not or only indirectly allude to the contemporary situation. In order to make the "subtext" of
the respective writings visible, it is necessary to give an overview on the wider ideological,
historical, and socio-political context out of which they emerge. The linkage between country-
or region-specific contexts on the one side and the reformatory projects on the other is
sometimes rather close–as in the case of Tunisian Opposition leader R. al-GhanÙshÐ–and
sometimes rather loose as e.g. in the case of Algerian born M. Arkoun. This is not only due
to the different disciplinary approaches the authors take toward their projects but also to their
living either inside the situation he or she seeks betterment for, or outside it, in exile. Possi-
ble success of the desired changes will be dealt with in the third chapter.
2) Contemporary Muslim Political Discourse: Between Confla-
tionism and Deconflationism89
Contrary to the concept of 'democracy' which remained a loan-word in both Arabic
(dÐmuqrÁÔiyah) and in Persian (dimukrÁsÐ), pluralism/taÝaddudiyah by the middle of the last
decade even became "indigenised" in Muslim languages.90 
                                                          
88 Cf. Freedom House's (1972-99) country rankings <http://freedomhouse.org/rankings.pdf>, I owe the reference
to A. Liese.
89 On a much earlier version of this chapter I received valuable comments from M. Beisheim, L. Broszus, D.
Senghaas, G. Walter, Ch. Weller, B. Zangl.
90 Cf. Yazbeck Haddad (1995:3), based on the 5th derivate of Ýadda/to count, taÝada/to multiply it- or oneself, cf.
Wehr (1985:816).
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The underlying problem of diametrically opposed worldviews is, however, by no means a
recent phenomenon in the Muslim world. After this short introduction I will depict this in a
short chronological survey on the discursive antagonism between the "conflationist" posi-
tion–based on the normative claim of an interconnection between the fanum/sacred and
profanum/profane sphere in public life–on the one side, and the "de-conflationist" attitude–
based on a separation of civitas mundi from civitas dei–on the other. After a short
clarification of these concepts (2.1),91 will then shortly expose to what extent both attitudes
are dependent on one another (2.2). In the following chapter (2.3) the scope of opinions
within the "moderate" conflationist debate is explored with regard to some concepts that are
pivotal to contemporary (unless otherwise indicated, SunnÐ) Muslim political theory: tawÎÐd/-
oneness of god (2.3.1), ijtihÁd/personal reasoning (2.3.2), naÒÐÎah/sincere advice (2.3.3) and
shÙrÁ/consultation (2.3.4). 
The inquiry into Muslim attitudes toward plurality thus oscillates between two analytical di-
mensions: in one dimension I try to unfold the scope of positions within the discourse itself
(mode of deliberation), in the second dimension I explore the contemporary interpretation of
the politico-juridicial concepts just mentioned with regard to their varying references to either
one's own heritage/at-turÁth or to foreign models (content of deliberation). I will then critically
assess those proposals (3), with regard to their potential contribution to the handling of plu-
rality in the respective Muslim societies overviewed in the first part of the paper. Like the
empirical overview, the inquiry is above all limited to internal plurality of predominantly Mus-
lim societies. This limitation concerning the procedure of research is based on the assump-
tion that the constructive accommodation of plurality within Muslim political thought is a nec-
essary (albeit not sufficient) precondition for an apt re-configuration of both the status of non-
Muslims in predominantly Muslim societies and for the way Muslims define their role in non-
Muslim societies–both of which are subject to a later inquiry.92 
2.1) Genesis
The emergence of plurality in the Muslim world in the sense of a public debate on funda-
mentally divergent outlooks on the world was instigated at the latest by Napoleon’s interven-
tion in Egypt 1798. Ever since this first material confrontation with Western civilisation, public
debate in the intellectual centre of the Ottoman Empire focussed on how to overcome Mus-
lim civilisation's apparent weakness. 
Recurring confrontations with the imperial powers and the resulting defeats urged a dis-
course on reform (al-'iÒlÁÎ) and polarised the attitudes with regard to the relationship be-
tween the worldly and the after-worldly, between the visible/al-manÛÙr and the invisible/khayr
al-manÛÙr, between the religion/dÐn and the world/dunyÁ. The conflationist outlook "IslÁm–
dÐn wa dawlah/Islam–religion and state" on the one hand and the deconflationist
differentiation of civitas mundi from civitas dei on the other, only represented the most
extreme poles within a continuum of possible attitudes. 
                                                          
91 I owe the terminology to Salvatore (1997).
92 For a first tentative approach, cf. my paper prepared for the 'Conference on Islam and Human Rights', March
15th-17th, 1999 in Sofia: The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam: Juridicial, Political and Religious Impli-
cations for the Status of Minorities <http://www-user.uni-bremen.de/~bjtraut/sofia.pdf>.
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A short note on the use of the terms 'conflationism' and 'deconflationism', which were only
recently introduced into the analytical disourse by Salvatore (1997:81f): In the following part
of the paper it will appear that 'conflationism' merely corresponds to 'fundamentalism' or 'Is-
lamism, 'deconflationism' would then correspond to 'secularism' or even (political) 'moder-
nity'. So, why not stay with these well-established notions? The reason for not or only cau-
tiously employing these more 'common' terms, is twofold: 'fundamentalism' historically
emerged out of the specific evangelical Protestant context. By way of projection of this no-
tion on any traditional and anti-secular conception of the world anywhere on the globe, its
original meaning ('The Fundamentals' of creed) was reversed to acquire today's decidedly
pejorative touch. 'Secularism' also lost the original impetus of Holyoake's 'Secularism-A Re-
ligion Which Gives Heaven no Trouble' (London ca. 1848 AD) to denote the rather technical
aspect of contemporary political systems and constitutions. Frequently applied in an essen-
tialist manner without taking into account the high degree of empirical variance in the histori-
cal development and implementation, 'secularism' regularly carries an unreflected positive
connotation in Western political discourse or an equally negative one for the conflationist
pole of Muslim political discourse. In addition to avoiding such a priori-judgements, it will be-
come clear in the following chapter that the terms 'conflationism' and 'deconflationism' en-
compass more than the historically highly circumscribed and ideologically charged notions of
'secularism' and 'fundamentalism'. Moreover, reformist projects of the kind investigated here
may seem 'secular' in the political context of a specific country in the Muslim world, but may
still appear 'conflationist' from the perspective of an essentialist understanding of secularism.
Back to the genesis of the radically opposed worldviews in the Muslim world: It is important
to keep in mind that the discussion within the Muslim community on whether innovation is a
"bidÝah/heretic teaching" or not is by no means a recent development of "fundamentalism". It
appeared from the beginning of and within the modernist discourse in the Muslim world as
becomes clear by the example of the controversy over sovereignty within the Young Turks
movement of the late Ottoman Empire: While Namik Kemal (d. 1888) assumed the right of
the community to choose its ImÁm/leader and that "the sovereignty belongs to all", his con-
temporary rival Ali Suavi formulated the antithesis of its divine origin, that sovereignty, in its
true sense, belonged only to God ("al-ÎÁkim huw-allÁh").93 After the final dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire and abolishment of the caliphate in the Muslim world (1924), ÝAlÐ ÝAbd ar-
RÁziq’s "deconflationist tabula rasa" (Salvatore 1997:89) by his inquiry into the foundations
of rule in early Islamic history then established a virtual watershed by claiming that Islam did
not offer a blueprint for the reform of the state nor for society (islÁm–dÐn lÁ/not dawla).
2.2) Conflationism and deconflationism–contextualised
The late Ottoman reformers, aÔ-ÓaÎÔÁwÐ’s positive account of French civilisation (1826-36) or
MuÎammad ÝAlÐ’s reforms (1811-33 AD) in Egypt notwithstanding, Western civilisation had
not yet turned into the ultimate point of reference for the "Islamic liberalism" (Binder 1988) of
Muslim intellectuals as al-AfghÁnÐ (d. 1897 AD), ÝAbduh (d. 1905 AD) or RiÃÁ (d. 1935 AD).
And how could it have been different? Deconflationism in Western contexts–also being an
open-ended quarrel between the church and the state manifested itself in the slow process
                                                          
93 Cf. Khir (1995:14). The concept remained pivotal to the political theory of contemporary Islamist movements–
most prominently it was formulated by Pakistani AbÙ AlÁÝa -l MawdÙdÐ and later reinterpreted by Seyed QuÔb of
Egypt, cf. Akhavi (1997).
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of secularisation which eventually gave rise to the institutionalisation of plurality (pluralism) in
liberal democracies there. In the core area of the Muslim world, the Ottoman Empire (nomi-
nally including Egypt) the debate between conflationist positions and deconflationist ones
was also open-ended at the time when ÝAbd ar-RÁziq's book came out (1925 AD). It took the
rise of deconflationism in the form of (mainly Arab) nationalism and related secular experi-
ments (Arab/Islamic socialism, BaÝathism) and eventually their failure to firmly re-institute a
conflationist position into the discourse on modernism. In the meantime, however, an im-
portant aspect had changed in that Western civilisation has by now become the ultimate
point of reference for both poles of discourse. Implicitly or explicitly an imagined or true ex-
ternal scale of "the West" underlies arguments both of Muslim modernists/conflationists, and
of secularists/deconflationists. 
Today both discourses claim they are in minority position: Secularists feel–sometimes very
justly–threatened by certain "Islamic" regimes or by militant "Muslim" movements in secular
countries (cf. Iran for the former, Tunisia for the latter). Sometimes–like in Tunisia or Turkey–
deconflationists seem to fear Islamists would want to transform society to a totalitarian Is-
lamic state. If moderate Islamists deny this, secularists tend to dismiss this as a lie in the
tradition of ShÐÝi taqÐah/disguise of motives.94 Conflationists, on the other side, point to the
overpowering secular reality both in their own countries, and especially in the West–"the
West" being perceived as dominating the rest of the world. 
Generally, representatives of both sides do not speak with each other but rather about the
respective other. Not surprisingly, their topics are also different: deconflationists, often in
view of threat to their own life, mostly speak up against militant Islamism. They rarely take
notice of moderate conflationist positions while not only extreme Muslim activists but also
moderate conflationists ("conservative Islamists" in the Egyptian context, cf. Ismail 1998)
complain about the shortcomings of the secular, especially Western societies:
"Islam’s superiority is tied to the moral corruption of the West, itself a cause of its suppo-
sed deterioration, bankruptcy, and inevitable collapse."95
So, as much as one tries to understand Muslim political discourse in its own terms, one can-
not ignore its recurring reference to an external scale–be it reflected or unreflected. In the
words of Egyptian conflationist Abdelwahhab Elmessiri:
"...all the trends and movements, religious or secular, irrespective of their ideological in-
clinations and social or ethnic backgrounds, had turned the West into a silent and ultimate
point of reference."96
On the other side of the discursive spectrum, however, it is equally possible that the persist-
ing invocation of "Islam" and "sharÐÝah" today is only a defensive reaction to the decon-
flationist discourse without much of an innovative aspiration on its own. It is certainly true,
that in the face of what Elmessiri (1996:151) calls "the imperialist secular epistemology" or
Arkoun (1993) named the 'Hegemonic Reason' (both Islamic and Western), the need is felt
to counter not only on a cognitive but also on a normative-structural level in order to estab-
lish an outright "Islamic matrix" (Sabet 1997:62). And indeed, from the 1970ies onwards
                                                          
94 Cf. Hassan's complaint on the mutual mistrust of motives (1996:184).
95 Ismail (1998:219).
96 Elmessiri (1997:51) and similarly M. ÝAmmÁrah, cf. Kügelgen (1994:180-203).
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there eventually developed a "hermeneutic field of political Islam" (Salvatore 1997:XV) on its
own. 
In order to prevent the conflationist discourse from a priori being disqualified for its purport-
edly "reactive"–even "reactionary"–thrust, it is important to understand its genuinely innova-
tive, and in that sense even "modernist" aspect ever since al-AfghÁnÐ. Both the persistence
and the potentiality of the discourse today cannot correctly be assessed without taking its
genesis into account:
"The establishment of Islam as the banner of the public function of religion, on the one
hand, and as a major key to the definition of a consensus of communication on the other
was a direct offshoot of the recomposition of the indigenous intellectual field in response
to colonialism and in the name of reformism."97
The emphasis on one's own heritage/turÁth, the claim on cultural authenticity/aÒÁlah (in the
Arab context, cf. Jabri 1995), and condemnation of intellectual innovation as "Westernisa-
tion/taghrÐb"–even as "Occidentosis/Westoxication"/gharbzadegÐ" (in the Iranian context, cf.
Àl-e AÎmad 1962) still structure the whole of the hermeneutical field of political Islam today. 
One recent example was the debate of the 200th anniversary of Napoleon's intervention in
Egypt (1798)–the Muslim world's first serious encounter with Western modernity. It is argued
that Muslims were not allowed to discover Western civilisation on an equal footing–not by
way of "tathÁqafah/interacting between cultures ('Inter-kulturation')". Rather, the advent of
Western civilisation in the Muslim world is today still interpreted in terms of a "shock of mod-
ernity/Òadmat 'l-ÎadÁthah."98 
Apart from the aspect of power, the philosophical implications of the confrontation between
(contemporary) Western civilisation and Muslims societies was subject of a vivid debate in
post-revolutionary Iran between the two philosophers ReÃÁ DavarÐ (ArdakÁnÐ) and ÝAbd al-
KarÐm SurÙsh.99 DavarÐ regards the "West" not only as a political entity but rather as an es-
sence determined by an ethical this-worldly humanism and by the separation of the state. A
virtuous society of the type DavarÐ envisages, however, could not be based on this Western
model of democracy, but rather on the axioms of guardianship and prophecy. Not even
Western technology is regarded as value-free but as a means of subjugation. Such, the
"West", represented by a "Western intellect" must, according to DavarÐ, be regarded as a
holistic entity, perpetually dominating the non-Western societies. As a consequence, non-
Westerners should not seek cultural exchange with Western cultures, let alone pragmatically
pick single achievements in the technological, social, economic, or political realm. 
SurÙsh repudiates all of DavarÐ's holistic worldview as historically determinist. No such thing
as 'the West' exists for him, non-Western societies are only confronted with individual West-
erners. Conversely to DavarÐ and the 'Nativists' before him, SurÙsh fears no dominance by
'foreign' influences, but on the contrary, advocates cultural exchange with Western civilisa-
tion. Challenging not only the orthodox approach to religious worldview by establishing the
accessibility of the latter to contemporary scientific methods and interpretation from the per-
spective of current social and political problems, SurÙsh also contests the clerics' monopoly
                                                          
97 Cf. Salvatore (1997:54, 81-95); first emphasis original, second mine.
98 Cf. R. BÙshlÁkah: Al-IslÁm yastawÝab al-Îadathah fÐ dÁkhilihi ("Islam Contains Regeneration Within Itself..") In:
al-ÍayÁt (London) March 10th, 1998, p. 19.
99 On the philosophical background of this debate, cf. Boroudjerdi (1996:156-75).
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of exclusive religious explanation. While his writings naturally incited fierce reactions from
the ÝulamÁ', his messages are echoed by the current Iranian president KhÁtamÐ, who–a cleric
himself–, against the background of an intimate personal knowledge of Western thought,
advocates learning from the diverse historical experiences of Western societies, and par-
ticularly the American one:
"We feel that what we seek is what the founders of the American civilization were
also pursuing four centuries ago. This is why we sense an intellectual affinity with the
essence of the American civilization." 100 
Dichotomisations between the 'West' and 'Islam' or between 'traditional heritage/authenticity'
and 'modernity' are also refused by Moroccan philosopher al-JÁbrÐ as 'fraudulent prob-
lems/mushkilah muzayyafah'. By way of deconstruction/tafkÐk of the authenticity/aÒÁlah-myth
through critical inquiry into the Arab-Islamic heritage/at-turÁth, he demonstrates e.g. that the
question whether 'Islam' is 'secular' or still awaits secularisation, in reality pertains to the
category of 'fake questions'. While insisting on the specificity of Arab-Muslim history in com-
parison to European history,101 he acknowledges both their mutual inter-penetration and the
thoroughly modern condition of Arab societies today. Rather than a wholesale import of for-
eign concepts such as secularism, which was formed under specific historical circum-
stances, al-JÁbrÐ opts for a renaissance and renovation of one's own–however strongly ne-
glected–aspects of Arab-Islamic heritage. By nevertheless also taking advantage of the
achievements (tawÛÐf muktasabÁt) from foreign thought, he claims to merely follow the "law"
of renaissance ("qÁnÙn" an-nahÃah) that made European renaissance successful.102
The above outline of some aspects of the current intellectual debates has been necessary in
order to understand that the secular/deconflationist and the non-secular/conflationist sub-
discourses are intertwined and interdependent to an extent which suggests that a thorough
process of mutual appropriation has taken place.103 This will be further vindicated by the
analysis of contemporary interpretations of various traditional concepts of pluralism (2.3.1 to
2.3.4). 
2.3) Plurality as an object of Muslim political discourse: conceptions of pluralism as
opposed to oneness and unity
In this section I will focus on the debate of concepts in the present religio-political debate in
the Muslim world that are related to the question of how to cope with plurality peacefully. The
inquiry is focussed more on the conflationist pole of the discursive continuum and on pro-
posals concerning procedural and institutional accommodation of plurality. In a first step, I
                                                          
100 Cit. from his interview with CNN on January 7th, 1998,
<http://www.un.int/iran/statements/other/other007.html>, or cf. his address to the heads of Delegations to the
Islamic Symposium on Dialogue among Civilizations, May 4th, 1999 <http://www.un.int/iran/dialog01.html>.
101 Particularly with respect to the evolution of a profane sphere of government in early Muslim history, cf. his
dialogue with Egyptian philosopher Íasan ÍanafÐ: ÍiwÁr al-maghreb wa 'l-mashreq. <http://www-user.uni-
bremen.de/~bjtraut/hiwar.pdf>, German translation>.
102 Cf. his interview to the Moroccan periodical al-MuqaddamÁt/Prologues (1997) no. 10, p. 53 (Arabic part).
103 Cf. Salvatore (1997) on the general Arab-Islamic context since MuÎammad ÝAlÐ, Ismail (1998) specifically on
the contemporary Egyptian debate, Dabashi (1993) and Boroudjerdi (1996) on the Iranian context.
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will limit the references to the deconflationist position to only those arguments which are
necessary to understand the innovative trait of the "moderate" conflationist approach. 
2.3.1) 'TawÎÐd/oneness of God' vs. political plurality?
The emerging political projects like that of exiled Tunisian opposition leader RashÐd al-
GhanÙshÐ seek foundations for accommodating political plurality within Muslim societies on a
basis explicitly different from that of purely utilitarian, "rational choice"- or "common sense"-
considerations that are seen to prevail in liberal-democratic political systems.
From contemporary Muslim conflationist viewpoint, moral virtue is not so easily dismissed,
since the result of this mode of governance–not only neutral toward, but devoid of any "val-
ues"–is held responsible for "Western" materially/technologically orientated and de-
spiritualised culture. According to this view, policy-making for predominantly Muslim societies
cannot be disinterested with respect to practical morality and social ethics. Contrary to the
positivist acceptance of the supposed inherently conflictual nature of modern societies and
the consequential setting up of a mediating agency in the form of the state, the "nature of the
political" in this perspective is rather normative and holistic–it is "where politics and morality
ought to be heading."104
Contemporary conflationists do not necessarily subscribe to the proposition that Islam im-
plies dÐn/religion and dawlah/state at the same time (IslÁm–dÐn wa dawla). Al-GhanÙshÐ, for
example, repeatedly refuted the Tunisian government’s allegation that he intended to re-
erect the outdated "Islamic state" of the prophet-cum-head of state. However, even other-
wise "moderate conflationists" like him insist upon a strong nexus between policy and moral-
ity on the basis of a redefinition of the tawÎÐd/oneness (of god)-axiom:
"This great principle in Islam, which rejects a lot of dualities between the body and the
spirit, between the mind and the spirit, between the individual and the society, between
the man and the woman, between the contemporary life and the afterlife, between the
worshipping of God and the economic system, between morals and economy...–the main
gift of Islam to this world is that it gives to all these dualities something of order and some
harmony among them... and within society itself... and within international politics."
The agent of this unity is the Muslim community/ummah at-tawÎÐd. Ideally, it is governed by
a single political regime, that derives its legitimacy from the supreme naÒÒ/text.105 As a poli-
tician, however, al-GhanÙshÐ also settles for less than the ideal.106
Genesis
Unlike any other Koranic stipulation or Islamic principle, the tawÎÐd-axiom epitomises Muslim
faith (and represents the only dogma there is in Islam for that matter). Literally tawÎÐd (infini-
                                                          
104 T. Asad in an interview with Saba Mahmoud, cf. Contested Polities (Stanford) vol. 5 (1996) no. 1
<http://shr.stanford.edu/shreview/5-1/text/toc.html>, emphasis mine.
105 Cf. al-GhanÙshÐ's interview with Tamimi (1998b:229).
106 Inconsistencies in al-GhanÙshÐ's writings are often regarded as signs for the essential 'insincerity'. In fact,
they seem to be based on his double-function as a writer and as a politician, cf. Tamimi (1998b:321ff).
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tive II, of w-Î-d) means "making one". It either asserts the one- and exclusiveness of AllÁh
or–in a maximum interpretation–it denotes a (rather elusive) pantheism. By leaning on the
latter interpretation, tawÎÐd can also turn into "a norm guiding socially responsible selves"
(Salvatore 1997:43). This shift of meaning from the (more or less personal and immediate)
sphere of knowing God by systematic theology/Ýilm or by maÝarifah/religious experience onto
to the worldly (public) sphere of social/political life can but subdue the latter under the for-
mer’s holistic paradigm. Under this paradigm, i.e. within the frame of the religiously founded
discourse, pluralism has had a long-standing tradition in the guise of various traditional con-
cepts (cf. 2.3.2 to 2.3.4). Plurality within this frame of reference is no problem, but it is
fiercely battled as soon as one leaves the grounds of this very wide scope and as purely
anthropomorphic arguments or concepts enter the debate. 
Diversity in Unity
Due to this holistic inter-relatedness of both spheres depicted above, opinions with regard to
the political outside the scope of divine (not Koranic!) tawÎÐd, may easily be dismissed as a
heresy even if–or rather just the more!- they are bare of religious foundation. Just as in any
other non-liberal understanding of politics (political conservatism, communitarianism) the
tawÎÐdic paradigm takes the idea of the political seriously in that it does not exclude the
question of whether a specific policy is good or evil from an ethical perspective which is ex-
plicitly deprived of human disposal. It claims a strong nexus between the way to do politics–
guide-lined by interpretation of divine revelation–on the one side and an ethically acceptable
state of society (‘justice") as outcome of policy on the other. In the critique of both the West-
ern liberal political systems and the authoritarian governments in Muslim countries, the
nexus unfolds from the other end of the argument: Because of the undesired outcomes of
the respective policies something must also be wrong with the mode of governance. From
this perspective, the de-spiritualised culture of materialism and the general loss of day-to-
day-morality in Western societies is inevitably due to their way of doing politics, viz. by sub-
stituting ethical considerations by aggregating group interests and managing the high diver-
sity of equally valid (secular) worldviews. Only for the price of denying all worldviews any
general validity to those worldviews, thereby devaluating each of them, and by reducing po-
litical ethics to mere material considerations and to zero- and positive sum games can this
potential conflict of opposed perspectives be defused. Defused but still virulent on the level
of politics à la 'Who gets what, when and why', plurality–in this perspective–is rather per-
petuated instead of accommodated or (in a maximum conflationist perspective:) anticipated. 
Some conflationists even go as far as to establish a tawÎÐdÐ-/unification epistemology in or-
der to counter Western style pluralism.107 Choudhury (1994), for example, rejects the idea of
pluralism explicitly on the ground that it denies any integration of or even interaction between
sacred and profane law. Both spheres cannot be thought of independently from each other
according to his "epistemic-ontic circular causation and continuity model of unified reality"
(Choudhury 1994:496). Thus, the tawÎÐd episteme attains a programmatic quality in that it
becomes the governing principle for a future Islamic state for Moten (1996). TawÎÐd be-
comes the Islamic paradigm according to AbÙSulaymÁn ([1982,1989] 1995) and in al-
ÝAlwÁnÐ’s (1995a) project to "Islamise" all knowledge/IslÁmiyat ‘l-maÝrifah". The latter project
                                                          
107 Abul-Fadl (1995), Ragab (1996:29).
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is naturally subjected to strong criticism from even the "moderate" conflationists' side within
the Muslim political discourse.108
As to the general modes of cognition, even rather deconflationist authors insist that diversity
and the claim of oneness/tawÎÐd need not necessarily contradict each other. Arkoun, for
example, upholds the oneness of what he calls the "Islamic fact" which is based on–but yet
distinct from–the "Koranic fact" in that the former represents a factual unity of messages and
advice emerging from the latter, i.e. certain axiological values emerge from the Koran "that
constitute the bedrock of Islamic discourse" (Lee 1997:157). According to Arkoun (1984),
there is, however, no privileged access to interpretation–let alone a possibility to ever ter-
minate the process of Koranic explanation. On the contrary, the presumed "need to close"
interpretation is–according to him–in itself proof for the openness and plurality of the tradi-
tion.109 While Arkoun (1993) clearly criticises the hegemonic character of the "Islamic rea-
son" which purportedly–ever since al-GhazÁlÐ (d. 1111 AD)–eradicated all rationalist traces in
orthodox Muslim thought and replaced it by theological speculation and ideological con-
structs, Abul-Fadl’s (1995) balance sheet of the history of Islamic pluralism is less critical
towards the own heritage:
"Historically, the Islamic paradigm of knowledge has proven congenial to the different
modes of knowing. The legacy of the BÐrunÐs, ibn al Haythams, al GhazalÐs, Ibn Rushds
[!], RÁzis and SuhrawÁrdÐs is a monument to this capacity to integrate and accommodate
the diverse modes or traditions within what is more of a synthetic rather than a syncretist
whole." (13f.)
By enumerating mystics as al-GhazÁlÐ, even illuminationists like SuhrawÁrdÐ side by side with
"confessing" rationalist/anti-mystic Averroes, Abul-Fadl of course belittles the gross cleav-
ages and even bloody conflicts between the protagonists of the different modes of knowing,
starting at the latest with the assassination of the mystic al-ÍallÁj (922 AD).
As it comes to the reality of coping with concurring truths and their political implications, plu-
rality regularly evokes the one, still very vivid trauma of Muslim history, the first civil war
which ended with the SunnÐ-ShÐÝi-schism of the Muslim world from the first Muslim century
onwards. Orientalist Lewis observed:
"The names of [ShÐÝi-leaders, BJT] Ali, of Yazid are as contemporary as this morning’s
newspaper, more so than yesterday’s."110 
Far from being a theological schism in the beginning, the core of the problem at that time
was a political one, namely the profane question of power, viz. the successorship of the
prophet-cum-head of state (himself devoid of any divine quality) in managing the worldly
affairs of the Muslim ummah/community. Unlike the catholic/protestant-schism of Christianity
there is no widely accepted official acknowledgement of status quo, a "Westfalian peace-
treaty" between the two confessions. In most countries of the SunnÐworld ShÐÝis are regarded
as a 5th column of any given foreign power. It is the potentially political, not the theological
dimension of plurality that is considered problematic. The leading SunnÐ law institution, al-
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Azhar in Cairo, in 1959 accepted the ShÐÝi JaÝafariyah maÆhab/law school as equally legiti-
mate as the four orthodox (SunnÐ) maÆÁheb/schools. 
Those orthodox maÆÁheb differ on a variety of subjects in Islamic law. So, contrary to popu-
lar assumptions, there is no consistent "body" of Islamic jurisprudence, hence no unified "Is-
lamic" world outlook and most certainly no model of an "Islamic state" which otherwise con-
flationist authors readily admit (cf. Moten 1996). However, it is also an open question how
wide the plurality of opinion within the framework of the maÆÁheb in general–as opposed to
single issues–is. Especially considering the fact, that contrary to the historical "pluralism in
the interpretation/taÝaddud ta’wÐlÐ" of the sacred texts, in the political sphere of today, Ýu-
lamÁ’/religious experts more often than not claim a monopoly of interpretation–always based
on the same "grand old jurists", ash-ShÁfiÝÐ, al-AshÝarÐ and al-GhazÁlÐ (AbÙ Zayd 1992:11,
272).
Defusing both tawÎÐd and plurality: semantic and epistemological implications of Muslim po-
litical modernity
Al-GhanÙshÐ is quite outspoken on a mode to do politics that is flexible in that it could pro-
duce innovative solutions that are regarded both appropriate to problems of contemporary
society. He also endeavours to render Muslim politics legitimate in that it refers to the Koran
and sunnah/prophetic tradition, viz. to ethical considerations which are withdrawn from hu-
man disposal. Because the interpreters of the sacred texts, the fuqahÁ’/Muslim jurists, in
modern times have more often than not bowed to the will of the worldly powers, all interpre-
tation became arbitrary and lost most of its original legitimacy, significance and flexibility. Al-
GhanÙshÐ now suggests to politicise the traditional arrangement of divergent interpretation
by the maÆÁheb so that the content of these interpretations is open to public "negotiation".
Again, "pluralism" in this understanding does not translate into an ethically uninformed public
deliberation which is the commonly held critique vis-à-vis "liberal" societies. Rather, al-
GhanÙshÐ advises to introduce the tafÁsÐr/traditional commentaries of the Koran into the po-
litical arena. Then, it is up to the electorate to choose from policy options that are derived
from the concurring interpretations of the Koran. Analogously, but in more general terms,
Iranian ÝAbd al-KarÐm SurÙsh insists on the relativity of all religious knowledge/maÝarefat-e
dÐnÐ. And while the criteria of judging between correct and incorrect interpretations of the
texts falls upon an 'enlightened' scholarly community, religious knowledge is in principal pub-
lic, just as the criteria for the judgement of correct and incorrect knowledge must be public
and by no means monopolised by the clerical establishment.111 As a result, neither religious
institutions nor a religious government provide for the spiritual and ethical foundations of a
society, but society itself determines the degree to which its life shall be in accordance with
these traditions. Naturally, al-GhanÙshÐ and SurÙsh's suggestions to 'democratise' the inter-
pretation of religious interpretation incited severe criticism from those claiming the essential
unity of religious thought as a basis for cohesion of Muslim societies.
The latter's claim, however, is vindicated on the every-day semantic level of language, where
the two Arab notions of tawÎÐd/oneness on the one side and taÝaddudiyah/multiplicity on the
other appear as plain antagonists. In the face of tawÎÐd’s (conflationist) incarnation, i.e. the
ummah/Muslim community with their strong religious connotations, both taÝaddudiyah and
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with it the notion of Îezb/’(political) party" prompts reflex-like associations with loathsome
difference/ikhtilÁf and division/tafarruq. A maximum conflationist view holds that "there can
be only one party in Islam, and that is the party of God (ÍezballÁh) which is opposed by only
one other party, that of the devil (Íezb ash-shayÔÁn)."112 In order to forewarn of cleavages
in society, extreme conflationists regularly quote the Koran: "Inna haÆihi ummatukum um-
matan wÁÎidatan/verily, this community of yours is a single community" (Surah 21:92).113
Conversely, reformists, quote a just as well known and accepted ÎadÐth/prophetic saying:
"IkhtilÁf al-ummah raÎmah/blessed are the differences within the ummah". And with refer-
ence to the Koran itself and to the orthodox tafÁsÐr/qur'Ánic commentaries, Egyptian
MuÎammad SalÐm al-ÝAwwÁ, contends that the idea of unity in the Koranic context only re-
fers to oneness in religion and belief, not to politics. According to him, applying this concept
to imply political oneness, as opposed to political pluralism, involves a "distortion of mean-
ing." 114
Al-ÝAwwÁ’s counterpart, Egyptian writer MuÎammad ÝÀmmÁra, attributes the negative con-
notations of Îezb to citations from the Koran like: "Fa taqaÔÝaw Ámruhum bainahum Ûuburan
kullu Îezbin bimÁladÐm fa riÎÙbÙna." (23:53): they cut their affair (of unity) between them into
sects: each party rejoices in that which it has." 115 Al-ÝAwwÁ, on the contrary, names just as
many Koranic verses that mention aÎzÁb (plural of Îezb) in a neutral context (e.g. Surah
18:12). 
The struggle with plurality–is it thus "merely" about semantics? Quantitatively speaking, the
answer is unfortunately yes:
"It should be observed..., that many controversies surrounding Islamic thought focus
so heavily on semantics, on names for ideas and persons, that the real issues often
disappear from sight... the whole confrontation [between conflationists and de-
conflationists, BJT] sometimes seems like so much posturing, where the real choices
are never clarified or faced."116
On the other hand, in the reality of today’s political systems in the Muslim world, it is no acci-
dent, that Muslim political movements still consistently refuse to label themselves "party/-
Îezb". If regimes in the Muslim world admit political organisations other than their own unity
party at all, Islamic movements prefer labels like jamaÝah, or derivatives of the verb "ja-
maÝah/grouping together" like the Yemenite Reform group, TajammuÝ al-yamanÐ lÐ-l-iÒlÁÎ.
Similarly, while Iranian president KhÁtamÐ advocates the establishment of a civil society and
political development, none of the currently identifiable groups and movements is named
party/Îezb. Along the same lines, Sudan's 1998 law on political associations employs the
newly created term of tuwÁlÐ117 siyÁsÐ in lieu of political party. 
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In a more general perspective, al-JÁbrÐ holds the Arab language as such to be incapable of
representing the political and social conditions of contemporary society. In his view, Islamic
sciences such as theology and law historically developed alongside the Arab language. The
latter determines to a great degree the methodology not only of these sciences, but also the
specificity of Arab-Muslim thought through the centrality of the qiyÁs/analogy-principle. De-
duction from the holy texts, instead of free reasoning/ijtihÁd, a historiography that up to today
merely records the history of diverse teachings in lieu of inquiring into their genesis and so-
cio-economic context opened the door for "possibilitism/jawÁz" or "tajwÐz" in Arab-Islamic
thought.118 Because of this epistemological 'blind eye', the representation of any empirical re-
ality–political, social or even natural–in Islamic thought remains blurred–and biased toward the
metaphysical. Against this background, basic ethical considerations are always implicit in eve-
ryday discourse on even the most 'profane' political and social problems. This simple fact must
not be neglected in the later assessment of the following traditional concepts which were origi-
nally not designed for the modern condition, but may–in modernist interpretation–just the more
acquire a function in the accommodation of plurality.
2.3.2) 'IjtihÁd/individual reasoning' and innovation of religious thought119
One case in point is the concept of "ijtihÁd/individual reasoning". The term ijtihÁd in the strict
sense of its origin in Islamic jurisprudence denotes the application of a variety of existing
rules or even the establishment of new rules in the ethical spirit of revealed law to a given
juridicial problem. One reason for the recurring invocation of this concept may be seen in its
undisputed nature as a religious duty of the Muslim community/farÃ kafÁ’Ð–in "urgent cases"
even as a duty of each single Muslim/farÃ ÝaynÐ (Kamali 1995:467, 490).
Other than mere imitation/taqlÐd or analogy/qiyÁs on the basis of the Koran and sunnah/-
prophetic tradition, ijtihÁd in the history of Islamic jurisprudence mostly entailed a fair degree
of ray’/personal opinion (cf. also 2.3.2) thus producing only Ûann, fallible opinion which is
ideally to be authorised by ijmÁ’/consensus of all the community in order to achieve iner-
rancy. De facto, however, ijmÁ’ always denoted a consensus only of the jurists/ÝulamÁ’.120 
Even the orthodox SunnÐ law schools differ widely as to the degree of personal freedom in
ijtihÁd–the ÍanbalÐ-school being the most restrictive, the ÍanafÐs the less restrictive.121
Within the ShÐÝi law school, the JaÝafariyah, the rationalist tendency of the UÒÙlÐs eventually
dominated over the literalist AkhbÁrÐs–unfortunately by methods that today would be consid-
ered as "rationalist fundamentalism": The founder of ShÐÝi orthdoxy, WÁÎed BehbahÁnÐ (d.
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1790), for example, declared anyone an unbeliever who dared to question his doctrine of
ijtihÁd.122
Conventional wisdom of both, orthodox ÝulamÁ’ and most Western orientalists still holds that
the procedure of ijtihÁd/"individual reasoning" was banned from the SunnÐ world with the
institutionalisation of the four maÆÁheb in the 9th century AD. Allegedly, afterward mere
taqlÐd/imitation within the legalistic framework of these schools was possible.123 And indeed,
only in 1985 the law academy of the RÁbiÔat ‘l-ÝÁlam ‘l-islÁmÐ/League of the Islamic World
formally "reopened" the "gate" of ijtihad. However, many of the early as well as contempo-
rary Muslim "modernists" contend that the practice of ijtihÁd actually never came to a halt.
Indian philosopher Muhammad Iqbal wrote as early as 1962 in his "Reconstruction of Relig-
ious Thought in Islam":124 
"The closing of the door of ijtihad is pure fiction suggested partly by the crystallisation of
legal thought in Islam, and partly by that intellectual laziness... which turns great thinkers
into idols... modern Islam is not bound by this voluntary surrender of intellectual inde-
pendence."125
And indeed, important contributions to Muslim political theory of the 20th century which are
now considered 'canonical' like Seyed QuÔb’s "ÝAdÁlat 'l-ijtimÁÝiyah fÐ ‘l-islÁm/Social Justice in
Islam" (1948, 51964) are at least implicitly based on ijtihÁd.126
Only recently a different perspective regarding the methodology of innovation emerged from
the Iranian context against the background of the relatively high degree of monopolisation of
all legal interpretation by the ÝulamÁ', since the Iranian revolution in 1979.127 Refusing to
embark on the legalistic obsession in contemporary Muslim reformist thought, SurÙsh advo-
cates a clear differentiation between immutable religion, with sharÐÝah at its core on the one
side, and dynamic religious cognisance/maÝrefat-e dÐnÐ, i.e. all human and therefore in prin-
ciple fallible knowledge of religion, on the other.128 While the operational boundary between
the two spheres remains opaque, SurÙsh, much like Indian philosopher Iqbal, pleads for a
broader approach to the contemporary understanding of religion. 
Based on the notion of a feqh-e pÙyÁ/dynamic Islamic law–as opposed to feqh-e sun-
natÐ/traditional law–SurÙsh suggests to make use of the methodology of modern sciences,
especially social sciences and humanities in the interpretation of religion. Religious knowl-
edge is dynamic in that: 
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"...this form of knowledge is, like other forms of knowledge, subject to all the attrib-
utes of knowledge. It is human, fallible, evolving, and most important of all, it is con-
stantly in the process of exchange with other forms of knowledge."129 
According to SurÙsh, the two opposed epistemic spheres of interpretation, the traditional-
static sphere on the one side and the dynamic one on the other, permeate into society by
mediation through their respective exegetes: the traditional 'alim (religious scholar) personi-
fies the "backward perspective/negah-e pÐshinÐ" of the "pious society" (jÁmeÝe-ye dÐndÁrÁn).
Conversely, the "enlightened intellectual/rushanfekr" represents a "forward outlook/negah-e
pasÐnÐ" for a society which is capable of regarding itself from an outward perspective,
thereby allowing for a radical plurality of worldviews based on diverse sources of knowl-
edge.130 The problem with this radical plurality lies less in a potential collision with the
tawhÐd/oneness-principle (cf. 2.3.1), but rather in the fact that those sources of knowledge
are regarded as 'foreign' (cf. 2.3). It is therefore of utmost importance for the credibility and
potential success of any reformist project to firmly establish its authenticity within its own
historical, philosophical, or semiotic heritage and to determine its stance toward 'borrowing'
from other sources.
To borrow or not to borrow? 
Moderately conflationist authors do not object to borrowing, albeit amalgamating with the
Islamic heritage, scientific approaches (SurÙsh), epistemological foundations (al-JÁbrÐ) or,
even political-institutional procedures and tools (al-GhanÙshÐ) from the West in order to cope
with contemporary phenomena such as political plurality in Muslim societies. For precisely
this reason, they are subjected to reproaches of being "Westernised" at least, or even "here-
tic". At best, their respective writings are denounced as "trivialization of the fundamental
principles of an Islamic political system" (Moten 1997). 
Al-JÁbrÐ, again from a more philosophical perspective, calls for a two-pronged approach: For a
clear rupture with the uncritical way of relating to the one's own historical and philosophical
heritage/at-turÁth. But while he considers the epistemological foundations ('contenu cognitif') of
(orthodox) Islamic philosophy outdated, its ideological matter ('contenu idéologique'), on the
contrary, may still be a source of inspiration for today's political thought.131 Thus, while in the
ideological realm there exists the possibility of choosing from different political options, taking
into consideration the qualitative difference (takhtalef ikhtelÁfan nawÝian) in the condition of
contemporary societies as compared to traditional ones, there is no alternative to today's
Western 'cultural model'. But instead of wholesale adoption of this model, JÁbrÐ pleads for an
ijtihÁd which keeps pace (al-ijtihÁd al-muakeb) with these internal changes. Such a contempo-
rary ijtihÁd requires both, an aptitude in the mastery of 'contemporary sciences, their cognitive
foundations and findings' just as much as a command of the (Arab) language and religious
sciences.132 It appears to be the latter then, that have to take a lead in the modernisa-
tion/taÎdÐth of Arab reason and in the re-foundation/tajdÐd of Islamic thought by critical re-
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appropriation/imtilÁk of its heritage "from within/min ad-dakhÐl". Al-JÁbrÐ particularly refers to the
neglected tradition of the critical rationalism of Averroes (d. 1198 AD) and others like Ibn Íazm
(d. 1064 AD) and ash-ShÁÔibÐ (d. 1388 AD).133 As to the foundations for the pivotal role of hu-
man reason/al-Ýaql in divine revelation, al-JÁbrÐ–contrary to conventional wisdom–maintains
that they were not laid down by the early kalÁm/theology of the MuÝtazilah-school.134 Rather,
human freedom manifests itself prior to all history as divine determination in the Koran and
sunnah/prophetic tradition.135 
While always remaining on a rather abstract level, al-JÁbrÐ thus tackles the task that is gen-
erally considered as the primary desideratum of Muslim modernism, namely the establish-
ment of a methodological connection between contemporary political and social challenges
on the one hand and traditional religious thought on the other. Nurcholish Majid, leading
Muslim conflationist thinker in Indonesia, specifically refers to the concepts of democracy,
human rights, constitutionalism, freedom of expression and association. His critique of the
earlier Muslim modernists is precisely that they failed to find an "organic relationship" of
these ideas with Islam.136
With respect to the sphere of law, Indian jurist ÝAbd ar-RaÎmÁn Doi137 depicts the general
framework for establishing this relationship as follows:
"...one will be driven to English, French or German legal systems and borrow from them in
order to find a solution to our legal problems. Any attempt of IjtihÁd to re-interpret the Is-
lamic legal principles... to suit the changed social conditions of our time will not be objec-
ted to, but mere change and departure from the Koran and Sunnah in order to import
French, English or Italian law... will amount to disbelief."
Still more difficult than establishing a general principle for ijtihÁd, is its actual operation in
concrete political, social and juridicial contexts.
IjtihÁd applied: conditions and constraints
In order to come to more concrete procedures for the application of ijtihÁd one has to take
into account its origin in Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore, specific stipulations with regard to
its field of application, are to be discovered in the respective writings on law. 
Expressing a conflationist position par excellence, Afghan law professor Kamali (currently
teaching in Malaysia) negates the commonly held distinction of ijtihÁd as a source subordi-
nate to the Koran and sunnah. He explicitly establishes that the sources of Islamic law are
                                                          
133 Cf. Kügelgen (1994:270f) .
134 MuÝtazilah designates a theological school starting with the theologian Í. al-BaÒrÐ (d. 728 AD) and becoming
official doctrine of the ÝAbbasid caliphs al-Ma'mÙn and al-MuÝtaÒim (813-42) before being declared heresy by al-
Mutawakkil (842-47). It is commonly considered as 'early Islamic enlightenment', cf. Nagel (1994:112f), Corbin
(1986:156) The historical fact that this first rationalist current in Muslim history usurped power and turned ration-
alism into a dogma, is held responsible for the common Muslim's aversion vs. most later attempts of introducing
supplementary cognitive foundations to orthodox Islam: "...rationalism came to be associated not with tolerance
but with authoritarianism and intellectual repression," Inayatullah (1996:6).
135 Cf. Gaebel (1995:40-42).
136 Cit. from Saeed (1997:293).
137 Cf. Doi (1997:471), he currently teaches in Nigeria.
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on the one hand "essentially monolithic"138 thus implicitly maintaining tawhÐd/oneness-
dogma: 
"The essential unity of the SharÐÝah lies in the degree of harmony that is achieved bet-
ween revelation and reason. IjtihÁd is the principal instrument of maintaining this har-
mony."
On the other hand, the dynamic character of ijtihÁd is stressed in that it is a "continuous pro-
cess of development" whereas the "nuÒÙÒ/(holy) texts" remain static (Kamali 1995:463):
"IjtihÁd continues to be the main instrument of interpreting the divine message and rela-
ting it to the changing conditions of the Muslim community in its aspirations to attain ju-
stice, deliverance and truth".
To which issues of life may ijtihÁd then be applied? Under the "sharÐÝatic paradigm" two dif-
ferent domains are to be identified in this respect: In the first (smaller) domain a "unity of
truth" is presumed and ijtihÁd may in principle not be applied (a), whereas in the second (b)
a "plurality of truths" is assumed (Kamali 1995:485):
a) Ijtihad may in principle not be applied to the sphere of Îaqq allÁh/god’s law (465ff):
? with regard to the essentials of creed, i.e. the questions concerning the prophethood
of MuÎammad and the oneness of AllÁh (the tawÎÐd-dogma);
? with respect to the obligatoriness of worship/Òalat, and other pillars of faith (ÝibadÁt)
like: zakÁh/alms tax, Îajj/pilgrimage and Òawm/fasting. 
? In accordance with orthodox SunnÐ tradition, Kamali also includes penal law/ÝuqÙbÁt
(including ÎudÙd). Muslim reformists, however, disagree widely on this classification
(cf. infra).
? IjtihÁd may not be applied to matters of pure intellectual (ÝaqlÐ) or customary (ÝurfÐ)
concerns. Matters that are "perceptible to the senses (ÎissÐ) and do not involve the
inference of a Îukm sharaÝi [judicial decision, BJT] from the evidence of the sources"
are precluded from ijtihÁd. In short, those matters that are not worth of any ethical
consideration, at all...
b) In principle, ijtihÁd may be applied to all temporal matters or, alternatively in a narrow
sense, to all matters in which no decisive ruling is found in the sources. This sphere of
law is commonly called "Îaqq adamÐ/human law" or "Îaqq muÝamalÁt/law of the social
sphere". Al-JÁbrÐ, by referral to a prophet's hadÐth ("You, [the believers] are more knowl-
edgeable regarding the matters of life [than I am]") regards all matters of life/al-ÎayÁh (as
opposed to religious worship) as accessible to renovation/tajdÐd, thereby suggesting a
'concealed secularisation'.139 
The distinction of a less sacred sphere of law from a wholly sacred one has up to today
hardly–except for rare cases–140been contested. It is even maintained that the orthodox
differentiation of "farÃ Ýain"/individual obligation" of the believer from "farÃ kafÁ’Ð"/obligations
of the community as a whole, i.e. the differentiation of obligation that are indispensable viz.
incumbent for "salvation" and others that may be dispensed, or delegated to others, "pos-
                                                          
138 Cf. Kamali (1995:463).
139 Cf. Gaebel (1995:36f).
140 Cf. Saeed (1997:282) on a ÍanbalÐ jurist (in 800 AH) who maintained that maÒlaÎah/public interest could
override even a clear text of the nuÒÙÒ (in cases other than worship).
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sesses all the intellectual and moral justification for the bifurcation of the law into a civil and
public and a religious and private sphere."141 In the absence of a church-like institution, this
classification represents the core of the argument that Islam is a 'secular religion'.
Against this background and following a well established argument in moderate conflationist
discourse,142 al-GhanÙshÐ, contrasts static sharÐÝah to dynamic feqh/jurisprudence: 
"Because reality is mutable, legislation varies accordingly. However, this evolution, in
normal conditions, does not transgress God's limits, that is, the ultimates of religion,
which constitute a general religious and moral framework, within which life and the
activity of reason evolve. Time and time again, that framework had been constricted,
as a result of Muslims treatment of an ever renascent reality with a worn, decrepit
Fiqh (jurisprudence). As if Fiqh were equivalent to Shari'a, although Shari'a is unal-
terable, while Fiqh is inconstant. Every age constructs its proper Fiqh (jurisprudence),
in other words, it devises its Islamic solutions, to the arising political and economic
problems."143
In order to counter maximum conflationist claims aimed at restricting even the freedom of
ijtihÁd in the sphere of muÝamalÁt, al-GhanÙshÐ maintains the idea of farÁghÁt/spaces–areas
left for humans to fill in accordance with the respective contemporary requirements as op-
posed to the sphere of the absolute, dÐn/religion (Tamimi 1998:42f). By accepting matters of
ÝaqÐdah/faith, ÝibÁdah/worship, akhlÁq/morality and even ÎudÙd/body-penalties as "sacro-
sanct" he does not in principle question the orthodox dichotomy. By way of this trade-off, al-
GhanÙshÐ is able to conserve murÙnah/flexibility of ijtihÁd for the profane, the relative sphere
of siyÁsÐ/politics.
The only means of subverting the farÁghÁt/siyÁsÐ-dÐnÐ-dichotomy is to be seen in shifting the
seemingly strict border between the two spheres of law. 
Based on the reknown theorist of public administration al-MÁwardÐ (d. 1058) and on philoso-
pher Ibn Rushd/Averroes (d. 1198 AD), Pakistani scholar Nyazee in his "Methodology of
Ijtihad’ (1994) tries to establish a third category, Îaqq as-salÔanah or "Îaqq as-sulÔÁn/right to
rule" or "law of the ruler" alternatively, independently from both haqq allÁh and haqq
muÝamalÁt. By contending that the right of God is distinct from the right of the state, Nyazee
provoked a strong rebuff even from the otherwise "moderate" conflationist Kamali.144
Indonesian neo-modernist Munawir Syadhali openly refutes classifying even zakÁh/alms tax
(pertaining to the five 'pillars' of Islam!) on the basis of the old dichotomy. Rather than de-
ciding the question by himself, he refers the decision to a broader consensus/ijmÁ’.145
The dÐnÐ-siyÁsÐ-borderline is also at least implicitly transgressed in a context-based ijtihÁd.
Most of the authors investigated here insist upon the fact that the authoritative nuÒÙÒ/holy
texts were not sent down in a "socio-political vaccum". Arkoun, al-JÁbrÐ, ÍanafÐ, AbÙ Zayd,
                                                          
141 Manzoor in a paper delivered to the Seminar on "Islamism, Pluralism and Civil Society" organised by the
International Forum for Islamic Dialogue ("Islam21"), London April 23rd, 1999
<http://www.islam21.org/main/23apr_manzoor.htm>.
142 Cf. likewise Egyptian philosopher Íasan ÍanafÐ in his dialogue with M. ÝA. al-JÁbrÐ: ÍiwÁr al-maghreb wa 'l-
mashreq, <http://www-user.uni-bremen.de/~bjtraut/hiwar.pdf>, German translation.
143 Cf. his interview to Intraview, February 10th, 1998 <http://msanews.mynet.net/intra2.html#sect2>.
144 In the American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences (Herndon/VA) no. 12 (1995) vol. 3, p. 413-18.
145 Cf. Saeed (1997:290).
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SurÙsh and most other moderate conflationists are explicit on the political, social, and eco-
nomic conditionedness of the revelation. While some apply straightforwardly Western meth-
ods of deconstructivism (al-JÁbrÐ) or semiotics (AbÙ Zayd) in order to explore the specific
context of revelation, al-GhanÙshÐ starts from the orthodox science of the purposes of
sharÐÝah, Ýilm maqÁÒed ash-sharÐÝah, whose objective, according to al-GhanÙshÐ, was to pre-
vent the rulers from exploiting the literal meaning of the text.146
Similarly, the Ýilm asbÁb an-nuzÙl traditionally merely denoted the science of historiographic
investigation into the occasions of the divine message as revealed to the prophet. Nurcholish
transforms this well established discipline into one of embedding revelation into the cultural,
political, economic, social, legal and moral context of its time. Thus, instead of literal/-
scriptural application, Nurcholish even attributes merely symbolical meaning to ÎudÙd-
stipulations (commonly assigned to the Îaqq allÁh) for contemporary times. Also with regard
to ÎudÙd, Syrian MuÎammad ShaÎrÙr (1992) in an etymological analysis invites a similar
conclusion in that the contemporary employment for Îadd (singular of ÎudÙd) in the Arab
language denotes "frontier/border". For him, penalties prescribed in the Koran thus display
only a maximum punishment. And since social conditions have changed so much today,
ÎudÙd assign merely hypothetical sentences.
Apart from the ÎudÙd-issue a similarly sharp controversy arises from the specific circum-
stance of daughters being entitled to only half the endowment that sons are entitled to, ac-
cording to "clear" Koranic text (cf. Koran 4:11 and other prescriptions which favour men over
women). By applying "contextual ijtihÁd", however, AbÙ Zaid (1996:185-89) departs from the
literal understanding by indicating the innovative thrust of the stipulation in the historical
context of pre-Islamic tribal society, which regarded women as objects of trade. In the end,
AbÙ Zaid also arrives at a more symbolical interpretation of the text by stressing the dynamic
aspect of the respective revelations that eventually require a full emancipation of man and
woman. 
Al-JÁbrÐ also tackles this problem by way of establishing the historical context of the incrimi-
natory stipulation. He subjects today's meaning of such stipulations to the
"maÒlaÎah/common good" of the Muslim community. He refers, for example, to the practice
of some Moroccan tribes in the 19th century AD, who, despite its apparent contradiction to
the sharÐÝah, abolished women's right to inheritance completely in order to avoid inter-tribal
quarrel–a threat to the whole Muslim community. By regarding maÒlaÎah/common good as
the core purpose of divine revelation, al-JÁbrÐ may in fact circumvent the latter's explicit pro-
visions as laid down in the sharÐÝah (except for provisos regarding worship/ÝibadÁt) without in
principle denying its validity.147
Who is entitled to the exercise of ijtihÁd?
Most conflationists agree on the personal qualifications the mujtahid (the one who accom-
plishes ijtihÁd) must meet: First of all he has to be an "active" Muslim performing all duties of
worship and he also must be a "competent person of sound mind who has attained a level of
intellectual competence which enables him to perform independent judgement." He not only
                                                          
146 Cf. Tamimi (1998b:289).
147 Cf. a lucid discussion of this aspect implicit in al-JÁbrÐ's writings, Gaebel (1995:33-39).
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has to be "knowledgeable in the various disciplines of religious learning".148 Kamali even
goes further in closing the ranks of the eligibles by referring to the ÎadÐth/prohpetic tradition
claiming that the ÝulamÁ’ are the successor of the prophets (472). Thereby he asserts that
only jurists may practice ijtihÁd. From a historical point of view, however, scholarly qualifica-
tion has not been the only criterion for the legitimacy of ijtihÁd: Not only from rationalist
MuÝtazilite but even from orthodox AshÝarÐ perspective, ijtihÁd, with the necessary conditions
present and under the legitimate presumption that truth may be multiple in the
'muÝamalÁt/sphere of social relations' even an ijtihÁd errant in result is rewardable both for
the sake of intellectual achievement and for the contribution to the eventual elaboration of a
better solution (by way of consultation/shÙrÁ, cf. infra 2.3.3).149 On this matter, al-JÁbrÐ pre-
sents the jurist Ibn Íazm al-AndalusÐ (d. 1064 AD) as an eminent authority against the mere
imitation/taqlÐd of earlier and established views and as an advocate for a plurality of inter-
pretations: ijtihÁd not only being a right but an individual duty of each Muslim:
Il n'est permis à nul homme... d'imiter quelqu'un d'autre, vivant ou mort, mais chacun
est tenu d'accomplir, autant qu'il le peut un effort interpretatif (ijtihad)."150
Those intellectually incapable of meeting their responsibility are to consult jurists, but the
latter are obliged to explain their method of interpretation to the client who, in turn, decides
on the appropriateness of this interpretation. Al-GhanÙshÐ draws on this orthodox practice
whereby single scholars proposed the results of their ijtihÁd to the people, who made the
final choice. Al-GhanÙshÐ argues that the establishment of the (now) canonical four SunnÐ
law-schools, thus are to be considered as "societal projects" in that they materialise out of
the interaction of Islam with specific social and cultural traditions. If the latter are changing,
the changes have to be accommodated by the juridical school, lest it loses its hold in pub-
lic.151 Specifically referring to the case of the contemporary Saudi system based on the
WahhÁbÐ interpretation of law, al-GhanÙshÐ maintains that the right of ijtihÁd remains open,
so no one may monopolise interpretations of religious texts.152 Similarly, UK-based Saudi
dissident Muhammad al-MassÝarÐ (1997) contends, every single Muslim–man or woman–is
empowered to ijtihÁd. A similar idea lies behind the notion of each 'citoyen musulman' as an
ex officio a faqÐh/expert in Islamic law.153
JÁbrÐ suggests, however, that a contemporary understanding of the qur'Án (faÎm al-qur'Án)
takes for granted a (minimum) cognisance of the history of revelation (tÁrÐkh an-nuzÙl), i.e.
the principles of abrogation (nÁsikh/abrogating and mansÙkh/abrogated).154 But once there
is an agreement on the formal conditions of ijtihÁd, then up to which degree may individual
reason, or reason in general, alter the literal understanding of the original?
                                                          
148 Cf. Kamali (1995:473)
149 cf. Kamali ([1989]1995:46,63 and 1994:486).
150 Cit. Ibn Íazm from Jabri (1995:113).
151 Cf. his interview with Tamimi (1998b:202).
152 Cf. his interview to al-AhrÁm Weekly, December 24th-30th, 1998
<www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1998/409/debate.htm>.
153 Cf. Herzenni (1997:23).
154 Cf. his interview to the Moroccan periodical al-MuqaddamÁt/Prologues (1997) no. 10, p. 46 (Arabic part).
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IjtihÁd, "ra’y/personal opinion" and reason
"Ra’y/personal opinion" is pivotal for the whole concept of ijtihÁd. In strict juridicial jargon,
ijtihÁd is nothing else than ikhtilÁf ar-ra’y/difference in opinion.155 Ra’y is thus defined as an
opinion on a matter which has not been regulated by the Koran or sunnah/prophetic tradition
and thus holds an element of arbitrariness. In a broader semantic analysis, the Arab notion
of "ra’y", is applied to things which cannot be seen, "but are known through the application of
reason, intuitive judgement, and the light of one’s heart" (Kamali 1994:62). Without having a
proper methodology of establishing its validity (other than by ijtihÁd and subsequent ijmÁ’/-
consensus), ra’y is also preliminary to knowledge and it is informed and directed by signs
which themselves are subject to investigation and rational conclusion. 
Reason/Ýaql itself, however, is relativised to the rôle of a mere complement of traditional nar-
ration/naql, and mysticism/taÒawwuf–all three being widely accepted modes of knowledge
(albeit not to all–even otherwise moderate–conflationists). Thus, Ýaql/reason is rejected as
the ultimate arbiter of the question what is to be considered Islamic and thus "legitimate" in
the realm of Muslim political discourse. Nurcholish, for example, specifically within in the
context of aÒÁlah/authenticity suggests to differentiate between "reason/rationality" and "ra-
tionalism": 
"Rationality is very commendable, but rationalism is not because if you follow the idea
and reason is the ultimate judge it is wrong of course." 
Similarly, the éminence grise of Malaysian reformist Islam, Seyed Muhammad al-Attas
([1978]1993), argues against the modernists tendency of negating taÒawwuf, the role of
mysticism in all spheres of Islam and of "rationalising" religion. Indeed, this tendency is very
strong in contemporary MaghrebÐ/North African conflationist thought156–stronger at least
than in the Mashreq/Eastern part of the Muslim world.
2.3.3) "naÒÐÎah/sincere advice" and freedom of expression in political affairs
The Koranic concept of naÒÐÎah (or munÁÒaÎah, alternatively) is praised as an "integral part
of Muslim pluralist tradition".157 In its original sense, it is commonly regarded as part of the
overarching "Îisbah/public order"-principle which itself is based on the cardinal Koranic
prinicple of "amr bi ‘l-maÝrÙf wa nahy Ýan ‘l-munkar/commanding the good and forbidding the
evil". Because naÒÐÎah stresses the former–in contrast to tawbÐkh/reprimand–, it is thus aptly
translated with "sincere advice, friendly admonition, and friendly reminder" (Kamali 1994:36).
Like ijtihÁd it is a collective obligation/farÃ kafÁ’Ð of the community but it also entitles every
individual Muslim to give sincere council to others according to a hadÐth/prophetic saying.
                                                          
155 al-BahÐ cit. from Kamali ([1989]1995:47)
156 With the notable exception of Egyptian Íassan ÍanafÐ. On al-GhanÙshÐ's decidedly anti-taÒawwuf stance, cf.
Tamimi (1998:57). al-JÁbrÐ maintains that the Arab-Islamic heritage had been 'infected' by Persian gnostic
thought, al-ÝirfÁn–subjecting the former's value system to "aÔ-ÔÁÝah/the obedience" [in fear of god, BJT] up to to-
day, cf. his interview to the Moroccan periodical al-MuqaddamÁt/Prologues (1997) no. 10, p. 48 (Arabic part).
'ÓÁÝah/obedience' to the infallible Leader (al-imÁm al-maÝÒÙm), is also the paradigm under which the Iranian
"velayÁt-e faqÐh/Trusteeship of the Jurist" is perceived in the Arab world, cf. e.g. W. KawthrÁnÐ's: ThalÁthah 'az-
manah fÐ mashrÙÝa 'n-nahÃat 'l-Ýarabiyah wa islÁmiyah ("Three Eras of the Arab-Islamic Renaissance Project",
extract from KawthrÁnÐ 1999, cf. references) In: al-Mustaqillah (London) June 22nd, 1999, p. 9. On the pathologi-
cal effects of ÔÁÝah on contemporary Muslim society cf. similarly Moroccan sociologist F. Mernissi (1996:213f).
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Both Kamali and Asad stress naÒÐÎah’s foremost function of expressing one’s opinion in po-
litical affairs freely. By also emphasising naÒÐÎah’s constructive nature, both authors insist on
its distinction from mere "political opposition" (for opposition’s sake) or (destructive) "criti-
cism" in liberal societies. NaÒÐÎah is a potentially face-saving mechanism of dealing with
plurality, since it must not partake in "exposing the privacy and personal weaknesses" of
people and is best given "being aware of the suitability of the occasion, the time, and
place...." (Kamali 1994:39). NaÒÐÎah underlies much less formal restrictions than ijtihÁd ac-
cording to Asad, since it is not restricted to "the educated and enlightened few":
"This is not a criticism that anyone coming from the outside, a total stranger, say, armed
with a fine sense of logical argument and a set of universal moral principles, can carry
out. So it is quite different from the notion of abstract and generalized criticism that has to
be confined to the enlightened, literate members of a polity." 
Furthermore, naÒÐÎah does not only constitute a right to criticise the political regime but an
obligation. Clearly departing from the general–even moderate conflationist–consensus Ka-
mali (1994:41) holds non-Muslims to be entitled to participating at shÙrÁ–except for matters
of direct bearing on ÝaqÐdah/faith, like the ÝibadÁt (cf. supra 3.2.2).
Not only the theory, but also the practice of naÒÐÎah in contemporary Saudi Arabia is praised
by Asad. According to him, naÒÐÎah proved very flexible. Being closely connected to the so-
cial conditions and the emergence of the modern Saudi state, both the purpose of naÒÐÎah
and its scope within the (religious) discourse of the ruling sect, the WahhÁbÐs, varied signifi-
cantly corresponding to the change of those conditions. While Asad upholds that naÒÐÎah will
in the future remain distinct from any liberal notion of public political deliberation, he admits a
more or less deep engagement not only of the WahhÁbÐ but all contemporary Muslim dis-
course to the "Western tradition", on the other.158 
Current Iranian president KhÁtamÐ also encourages public criticism though he argues vice
versa. While maintaining the distinctness of 'religious societies' (such as the Iranian one),
compared to contemporary Western societies, KhÁtamÐ is nevertheless positively impressed
by liberal political thought from the West, and from the US in particular. Since he is still firmly
rooted in the Muslim intellectual tradition, KhÁtamÐ is provided with the necessary legitimacy
for his synthetic approach toward dealing with plurality: In his statements–whose immediate
reference to the political struggle with the authoritarian fraction inside the Iranian power-
structure is always to be taken into account–159he courageously contends that social cohe-
sion (waÎdat-e mellat) is not jeopardised by the freedom to express (individual) views and
criticism. On the contrary, he says, it will "lead the society to a deeper and more structured
sense of cohesion and unity."160
                                                                                                                                                                                    
157 T. Asad in an interview with Saba Mahmoud, cf. Contested Polities (Stanford) vol. 5 (1996) no. 1
<http://shr.stanford.edu/shreview/5-1/text/toc.html>.
158 "I can't see how any non-Western tradition today can escape some sort of an engagement with Western
modernity. Because aspects of Western modernity have come to be embodied in the life of non-European socie-
ties," in an interview with Saba Mahmoud, cf. Contested Polities (Stanford) vol. 5 (1996) no. 1
<http://shr.stanford.edu/shreview/5-1/text/toc.html>.
159 Cf. supra 1.2.4.
160 The president's speech cited from the Iranian periodical ÓÙs August 27th, 1998
<www.persia.org/khatami/tous27aug.html>.
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2.3.4) "ShÙrÁ/consultation" vs. democracy?
Compared to the above mentioned concepts, "shÙrÁ/mutual consultation" is perhaps the
most important in the conflationist sub-discourse and yet the most contested one in the
whole scope of Muslim political discourse. Other than the concepts mentioned above, shÙrÁ
does not strictly derive from Islamic jurisprudence but it is commonly regarded as equal to
the five principal features of dÐn/religion (cf. al-ÝibadÁt supra 2.3.2).161 While in quantitative
terms (frequency of reference) it is more pivotal to the discourse than any of the concepts
tawÎÐd, ijtihÁd, naÒÐÎah mentioned above, there is yet even less consensus on its procedural
and institutional framework.
Genesis
In the original Koranic context (SÙrah 42:36) shÙrÁ denotes the consultative body for the
election of the prophet’s successor. The procedure has already been modified significantly in
the early history of Islam, precisely in the period of the KhulafÁ’ ar-rashÐdÙn, the "rightly
guided Caliphs". Since the reign of these first four successors of the prophet is generally
included in the referential period (to varying degrees of obligation) for the conflationist dis-
course, and the appointment of each of the four followed different rules of
shÙrÁ/consultation, it is no surprise that today the concept is far from being coherent. ShÙrÁ
can denote virtually any form or institution of participation at any level of both private and
public decision-making from governmental down to family affairs.162 In exactly this capacity,
Kamali (1994:46) submits to regard shÙrÁ "as a distinctive feature and hallmark of Muslim
culture, and as a model for its socio-political development". Similarily, Sudan's Íassan at-
TurÁbÐ considers it as an ideal "way of life" for all Muslims.163
Explanations for the rise of shÙrÁ as a principle governing the whole range of the conflation-
ist (and consequently the anti-conflationist) discourse in recent years, are offered against the
background of the "azmah ad-dÐmÙqrÁÔiyah/crisis of democracy" at least in the Arab world
after the 1967 nakbah/catastrophe (defeat against Israel), the Israeli intervention in Lebanon
(1982-85) and the second Gulf war (1990/91), all of which exposed the weakness of the
Arab regimes–regimes which heavily refused political participation. Based on such a merely
negative balance sheet of coping with political plurality, shÙrÁ is consequently transformed
into a synonym for the call for political participation. The right (of the ummah, the Muslim
community) to elect its leader can be regarded as the smallest common denominator of cur-
rent shÙrÁ-interpretations.
                                                          
161 Cf. Kamali (1994:42), Tamimi (1993:22).
162 A whole session out of seven was devoted to the shÙrÁ-principle in the Conference on Contemporary Islamic
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"ShÙrÁqrÁÔiyah/shÙrocracy" 
No one lesser than King Íassan of Morocco's nephew164 asserted that shÙrÁ in the main-
stream of Muslim theorists (SalÁfÐ) today is even synonymous with elections and parlia-
ments. Other authors openly fuse shÙrÁ and democracy to "shÙrocracy/shÙrÁqrÁÔÐyah".165 
Conversely, in a "comparative analysis" of both systems, shÙrÁ and democracy, Moten
maintains that shÙrÁ’s "consultative, consensual model that leads to co-operative decision-
making" is diametrically opposed to Western democracy which "accepts conflict and com-
promise as a normal political process" (1997:15). Like at-TurÁbÐ and AbÙSulaymÁn, Moten is
thus convinced of shÙrÁ’s superiority over present-day Western democracies.
Consultation vs. control
By way of contextual ijtihÁd/individual reasoning (cf. supra 2.3.2) and in clear disregard of
shÙrÁ’s rather weak institutionalisation in early Islamic history,166 conflationists today agree
that it is a ruler’s duty to seek advice.167 The consensus is wide on the assertion that shÙrÁ-
decisions cannot be vetoed by the executive power.168 Art. 33 of the "Model of an Islamic
Constitution" published by the Islamic Council of Europe (1983) even yields the power of
impeachment of the leader/imÁm to the "majlis ash-shÙra/consultative assembly" in case the
former "intentionally violates the provisions of the constitution, or for a wanton violation of the
Shari’ah."169 Only because the source of (secular) power lies in the ummah/Muslim com-
munity it can be delegated to a ruler controlled by the representatives of the people. Political
legitimacy is thus derived from the people, not from sharÐÝah:
"Islamic rule is by nature democratic. Basically, because it derives its legitimacy from
the people and, if people withdraw their support, it loses its right to remain in
power."170
Unlike ijtihÁd, which is based on individual ra’y/opinion and is thus highly fallible, shÙrÁ as a
collective endeavour may not only refer to the temporal-political/siyÁsÐ realm. It may also
address the religious/dÐnÐ-sphere because its results are considered much more reliable.171
Indeed, shÙrÁ is conceived of as the "divine order",172 or alternatively, as bÁb min al-abwÁb
                                                          
164 Hichem el-Alaoui: Etre citoyen dans le monde arabe. In: Le Monde Diplomatique (1995) no. 7, p. 11.
165 Cf. Yazbeck Haddad (1995:18).
166 Cf. authoritatively Djaït (1989:73ff) on the historical background. Historians like M. al-Faruque or S. Moham-
med/UIM, Malaysia are reluctant with regard to the application of the traditional shÙrÁ-concept to today's socie-
ties. Cf. an-NaÝim (1989:79f) for a critique from a juridico-political perspective.
167 Kamali (1994:42f), Ghannouchi (1993:55), political scientist al-Alkim from the United Arab Emirates in
Tamimi (1993:83), cf. also an overview in Yazbeck Haddad (1995:13ff).
168 al-Alkim in Tamimi (1993:81), al-Ghannouchi–based on al-ÝAwwÁ (1993:71). This question pertains to the
concept of muÎÁsabah/accountability, cf. Moten (1996:121) also asserting that the (state) "amÐr/leader" must
adhere to the conclusions of the shÙrÁ. Kamali, however, leaves the matter formally open to yet another effort in
ijtihÁd (1994:45).
169 Cf. Moten (1996:123, text of the document on 173f).
170 Al-GhanÙshÐ in his interview to al-AhrÁm Weekly (Cairo) (1998) no. 409
<www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/1998/409/debate.htm>.
171 Cf. Kamali (1994:44).
172 Cit. al-Alkim in Tamimi (1993:81).
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'ilÁ 'l-Îurriyah/"door of the doors to freedom"173–even as a "collective endeavour for seeding
an objective truth."174  Such is not necessarily achieved by decision-making processes in
which merely the strongest fraction prevails. Moten (1997) therefore deems shÙrÁ superior to
(his conception of) Western-style parliamentarism. However, with regard to the mechanisms
of everyday decision-making, he concedes voting as a legitimate measure, based on
AbÙSulaymÁn, in questions that do "not concern matters of justice but... a case of preferring
one to the other".175
The most ample difference between shÙrÁ and parliamentarism lies in that the former can
not–at least not openly–acquire legislative functions, particularly not so as injunctions from
the sharÐÝah are concerned:
"...Muslims can consult each other about matters in the Shari'ah regarding the correct
meaning of a particular clause and correct observance of it in order to fulfil its pur-
poses; but they cannot confer together with the purpose of replacing or altering in any
manner the ruling or decision of Allah and His prophet by their own conclusions."176
It is the essence of Muslim conflationist worldview to regard the ultimate source of all law as
divine. Thus law cannot newly be "created" as in secular legislation, it can only be "ex-
tracted" from the sharÐÝah or, as al-GhanÙshÐ (1993) holds, be "enacted".177 So, for good
reasons, contemporary conflationists tend to circumvent the problem of legislation by
stressing the procedural function of shÙrÁ/consultation as an electoral principle and as a
control-agency in the context of the executive’s general muÎÁsabah/accountability to the
people.178 The al-Azhar draft constitution of 1978 and the 1983 Islamic Council of Europe
constitution therefore suggest a compromise between mere "law extraction" or even "law
enactment" (Rechtsschöpfung) only, on the one side, and genuine legislation
(Rechtssetzung) on the other. According to art. 21(a) of the Council’s draft, the majlis ash-
shÙrÁ shall "legislate promoting the objectives of the SharÐ’ah..." or alternatively, shall "legis-
late in accordance with the injunctions of the SharÐÝah" (art. 83.1, al-Azhar). Both of the for-
mulations fall back behind the relevant stipulation of the Iranian constitution–as well with
respect to their rigidity ('in accordance' or 'promoting the objectives') as with their reference
to what is insinuated as a once-and-for-all established corpus juris, namely "ash-sharÐÝah".
Somewhat more moderately, art. 72 of the Iranian constitution prohibits the Iranian majlis-e
shÙrÁ (parliament) to "enact laws contrary to the usual and ahkam [morals i.e. lat. ius as
opposed to lex, BJT] of the official religion of the country" and, alternatively, laws contrary to
the secular constitution.179
                                                          
173 W. KawthrÁnÐ: ThalÁthah 'azmanah fÐ mashrÙÝa 'n-nahÃat 'l-Ýarabiyah wa islÁmiyah ("Three Eras of the Arab-
Islamic Renaissance Project", extract from KawthrÁnÐ 1999, cf. references) In: al-Mustaqillah (London) June 22nd,
1999, p. 9.
174 Moten (1997:16, emphasis original).
175 Moten (1997:15).
176 Cit. Doi (1997:19).
177 Cf. similiarly al-Alkim in Tamimi (1993:81).
178 Moten (1996:101f, 120-25), Kamali (1994:41-46), al-ÝAwwÁ (1993:70-72).
179 Cf. the official constitutional text in English from the website of the Iranian government
<http://www.salamiran.org/IranInfo/State/Constitution/articles/a072.html>. Cf. supra 1.2.4 on the role of the
Guardian Council in overseeing this prohibition. On the differentiation of Îukm (pl.: aÎkÁm), i.e. ius, from qÁnÙn/
lex, cf. Schumann (1999:45f).
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Conditions and constraints
Also unlike the procedure of ijtihÁd, the conditions which have to be met in order to launch
shÙrÁ are much less clear. 
Two main approaches concur on the question of who is eligible for shÙrÁ:
a) An "élitist" shÙrÁ consists of: 
? the honourables, i.e. the representatives of the military, tribes and clans. The Saudi ma-
jlis ash-shÙrÁ/Consultative Assembly is more modernist in this respect, since it includes
professionals of all kinds, and representatives from the business world. Still, its members
are hand-picked by the rulers.
? Or it consists of the jurists/Ýulama’, only. 
? Alternatively, the former two options are combined (cf. e.g. al-ÝAwwÁ180). A case in point
is the Iranian shÙrÁ-ye negahbÁn/Guardian Council whose non-jurist members have no
say in the vote concerning the conformity of the majlis-e shÙrÁ/parliament's (quasi-
)legislation with the "usual and ahkam of the religion".
b) The emancipatory opinion follows the general recommendation that everyone who is
(personally) concerned by a matter, should have the right to voice his view upon it, thus
presupposing not only an unrestricted right of freedom of expression but in particular the
freedom "if necessary, to criticise the government for the maÒlaÎah[/common good, BJT]
and benefit of the community".181 
A combination of a) and b) has been operationalised in the draft constitution of 1983 whose
art. 20(a) requires that the members of the majlis ash-shÙrÁ should be directly elected by the
people, and art. 21(a) compells the members to seek the opinion "as necessary" from a
Council of ÝulamÁ’. The latter is then explicitly entitled to practice ijtihÁd (art. 65a).182 Like
shÙrÁ's functional limitations concerning legislation, the terms of its composition have also
been further refined by the Iranian constitution whose art. 62 stipulates: "The Islamic Con-
sultative Assembly is constituted by the representatives of the people elected directly and by
secret ballot."183 A fair departure indeed, from the hand-picked shÙrÁ as practised by the
companions of the prophet, (which included men only, by the way).
3) Conclusions
Conventionally, Muslim reformist projects are assessed from an ideal deconflationist view-
point.184 While this secular outlook can be regarded as firmly instituted within the Muslim
political discourse itself, it ultimately remains incompatible with the conflationist perspective
(cf. supra 2.2). Because of this conceptual incompatibility, a tertium comparationis, an over-
                                                          
180 Cf. Müller (1996:132).
181 Kamali (1994:45f), cf. similarly Moten (1997:15).
182 According to art. 66 the council's composition and the qualification of its members shall be determined by
law, cf. Moten (1996:181).
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arching meta-level of analysis–topping the conflationist-deconflationist dichotomy–is logically
impossible to establish. The only fertile assessment of the mentioned projects is therefore
from a perspective based on the shortcomings of the current handling of plurality in both
secular and synthetic political systems.
The empirical overview (cf. supra 1.2) illustrated the common failure of both the secular po-
litical system (Tunisia) to accommodate the conflationist challenge, and the synthetic political
systems' failure (Morocco, Saudi-Arabia, and Iran) to accommodate the deconflationist
challenge. 
The plurality of approaches: from country-specific to methodologically orientated
projects
The reformist approaches to the malaise (cf. supra 2.3) differ according to the specificity of
the case: Tunisian al-GhanÙshÐ adapts to the country's secular orientation in that he is ready
to have the Western (secular) political toils like elections and political parties adopted as a
basis for the metaphysically informed public deliberation in the public sphere. Conversely–
emerging from synthetic contexts Iranian SurÙsh, and to a lesser extent Moroccan al-JÁbrÐ,
approach the problem of accommodating the deconflationist perspective by first establishing
pluralism as a fact of Islamic worldview and history. From a perspective which insists on a
more or less close connection between the sacred and the profane realm, the accommoda-
tion of political plurality necessitates that profane plurality be mirrored by plurality in the
realm of fanum and in a more complex manner, namely on philosophical, ethical, and
(eventually) metaphysical planes. This is the focus of conflationists reformist thought and
empirical analysis, rather than the elaboration of political projects or specific constitutional
projects. Even otherwise conflationist authors readily admit that there is no historical model
of an 'Islamic state' and, as the overview of reformist projects has illustrated, there is no uni-
fied 'Islamic' political thought, let alone a closed body of Islamic jurisprudence. Except for an-
NabÎÁnÐ’s draft constitution from the 1920s,185 the al-Azhar draft constitution of 1978 and
the Islamic Council for Europe’s 1983 constitution, few ventures have been undertaken to
develop an institutional framework for the conflationist social and political utopia. One of the
more recent and perhaps most pertinent examples, Moten’s proposals for an "Islamic politi-
cal system" (1996) merely refers to procedure (shÙrÁ) and general principles (tawÎÐd,
sharÐÝah), instead of elaborating institutional frameworks to attain the goals suggested there
like ÝadÁlah/justice, Îurriyah/freedom, and musÁwÁh/equality. 
This operational and institutional void is unsatisfactory from the perspective of social and
political science. However, by establishing a more or less radical plurality of interpretations of
Islamic history and revelation, and by introducing it into the conflationist discourse as a
genuine fact of intra-religious pluralism, more of a solid basis may be provided for the ac-
commodation–or rather the defusing–of both, the conflationist and the deconflationist ex-
tremist attitudes in the long run. It is precisely the common thrust of most of the aforemen-
tioned reformist projects: the accommodation not only of 'trivial' differences of opinion, but
                                                                                                                                                                                    
183 Cf. the official constitutional text in English from the website of the Iranian government
<http://www.salamiran.org/IranInfo/State/Constitution/articles/a062.html>.
184 Preferably in the realm of human rights, cf. e.g. Bielefeldt (1998).
185 On the revolutionary ideology and the draft constitution of the Jordanian Íizb at-taÎrÐr/Liberation Party, cf.
Taj-Farouki (1994).
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rather, the determination of a mode for handling the 'irreconcilable entities' of conflationism
and deconflationism in the public sphere, without giving in to either of the extremist atti-
tudes–each of which produces the known pathological outcomes like the violation of human
rights, in particular the infringement of the freedom of expression (cf. supra 1.2.5). A full rec-
onciliation of both attitudes is logically infeasible in the sense that in the last instance there is
only a choice between the epistemological models emerging from either anthropo-centered
'Athens', or theo-centered (rather: nomocratic) 'Jerusalem'. Still, in order to appease this
already highly virulent and partially even manifest Clash within Muslim Civilisation, and in
order to avoid its eruption in yet more places, it is important to understand that it was pre-
cisely the pursuance of these essentialist worldviews in the political arena–irrespective of the
particular operational and institutional framework–which led to the contemporary crisis.186 
Reconciling the irreconcilable? Between hypocrisy and genuine innovation
Are modernist interpretations of concepts like tawÎÐd, ijtihÁd, naÒÐÎah, and shÙrÁ capable of
handling this radical plurality of worldviews? Trying to reconcile the irreconcilable, does that
invite for phoniness at the operational level and for mere symbolical politics of the kind Gell-
ner observed?
"What strikes observers is the curious combination of religious moralism and cynical cli-
entilism... It is as if the society's moral requirements were adequately met by the fact
that the state enforces, or at least does not violate, the Law..."187
It is true that any political or social project formulated outside the semantic realm of Islamic
terminology and thought (reference to the Koran and/or sunnah) would not fit properly into
the accommodative concepts or procedures mentioned above (cf. 2.3). Few Muslim reform-
ists dare to openly question the authority of sharÐÝah in principle. However, apart from the
fact that there is a broad variety of interpretation of sharÐÝah's stipulations available, re-
cent188 and not so recent historical research uncovered that even undisputed limits set up by
the sharÐÝah have always de facto been systematically transgressed while their obligatory
character has not been invalidated in principle: 
"...Islamic law is conscious of its character as a religious ideal;... it takes the corruption
of contemporary conditions for granted... Islamic law is to some extent content with
mere theoretical acknowledgement."189
Since "history" figures and will in the foreseeable future not cease to figure as a strong point
of reference in the conflationist political sub-discourse, the question arises, whether contem-
porary (as opposed to bygone) societies could peacefully cope with a merely "ideal" rule of
law, while important (secular) public affairs would rest largely outside of sharÐÝah’s scope? To
which extent can semantic elaborations suffice to cover up the incoherence of applying the
sharÐÝah in contemporary contexts or, to put it more provocatively, is there a point of no re-
turn after which the rupture with the sharÐÝatic paradigm must openly be admitted as the final
"defeat" of the conflationist worldview? 
                                                          
186 On the pitfalls of essentialist worldviews cf. supra 2.1 and the profound critique of al-Azmeh (1993).
187 Cf. Gellner (1994:27f), emphasis original.
188 Simonsen/Toll (1995).
189 Cit. Schacht (1966:199).
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The practice of today’s regimes in the Muslim world (both 'secular' and 'synthetic') supplies
two rather contradictory insights: Profane concerns have regularly been dressed up "Islami-
cally" (by way of fatwÁ–issued by state-employed ÝulamÁ') mostly devoid of any previous
broad public deliberation which could determine both the extent of popular support and their
value from an ethical viewpoint. So, on the one hand, the mere employment of religion on
the part of autocrat rulers only furthers the bigotry of the latter vis-à-vis the citizens and the
hypocrisy of political debate on policy issues in general. Apparently, this strategy tries to
avoid additional ideological polarisation of an increasingly politicised society. However, the
examples of both Egypt and Algeria inform us that this half-heartedly bowing to extremist
demands in some policy issues had not foreclosed (if not nurtured) the rise in militancy of
Islamist movements. This is due to the fact that–in order to stay in power–governments fail
by denying the respective protagonists a regular participation in political life, to reveal the
latter's responsibility vis-à-vis the people who are affected by those policies. On such an
empirical background Gellner's assessment holds true: 
"The expectation of some additional Civil society, which could hold the state to account,
on top of the Umma defined as a shared commitment to the implementation of the Law,
would seem almost impious, but in any case unrealistic. The state can be called to ac-
count for violation of divinely ordained Law, or for the failure to implement it, but not for
some additional requirements imposed by the popular as opposed to the divine will...
Here we possess a viable... social form, an absolute moral community, which seems to
work tolerably in a modern or quasi-modern context, and which accommodates itself
without too much discomfort to what are for us political imperfections..."190
Quite conversely to this resigned outlook, the main thrust of contemporary reformists is pre-
cisely the demand for broader political participation, co-operation with and even inclusion in
the political process. Consequently, the call for 'accountability/muÎÁsabah' falls back onto
Muslim activists themselves. And indeed, we do possess empirical support for this argu-
ment: Embracing the protagonists of Islamist movements from the side of the government,
i.e. the 'Integration of the Integrists' eventually led to the peaceful deflation or, to remain pre-
cise, to the 'deconflation of the conflationists' e.g. in the Jordanian case since 1989.191
Broader political participation at all levels and furthering of the freedom of expression may
also help to avoid typical pitfalls in the process of modernisation of society. The modernisa-
tion of law must be regarded as the central motor of this process. The fact that the refur-
bishment of Islamic law from within its own tradition had been blocked or else not been im-
plemented is just the more deplorable since its mere substitution had rendered illegitimate
the whole project of modernisation for the lack of authenticity. The tension between innova-
tion on the basis of diverse Islamic traditions by takhayyur/choice and talfÐq/fusion of (legal)
opinions or ijtihÁd on the one hand and borrowing from completely different legal norms on
the other side is not only hypothetical: Most law systems in the Muslim world have at one
time or another been completely supplanted by secular laws of foreign origin with the excep-
tion of the synthetic creations of the "Anglo-muhammedan law" based on the ÍanÁfÐ-school
in South-Asia and the "Droit musulman algérien" which was created and applied (mainly in
Tunisia) by the French during the occupation of North-Africa on the basis of the MÁlikÐ-
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191 Cf. Krämer (1994), Robinson (1997).
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school dominating there.192 It is significant in this context, to remember how very little resis-
tance was advanced from the side of the orthodox ÝulamÁ’ when, e.g. between 1850 and
1863, sharÐÝah was supplanted by completely new laws in the Ottoman Empire. However,
some five decades later the resistance was strong against the codification of ÍanafÐ law in
1917. Why? The latter entailed that a choice had to be made between those parts of sharÐÝah
which deemed to suit that time, and others that did not. The complete substitution, on the
contrary, could have left the ideal of revealed law untouched and the hope persisted "to save
it up for better times to come".193 Therefore, from a historically informed perspective, proj-
ects such as al-GhanÙshÐ's or SurÙsh's, which are aimed at 'democratising' the interpretation
of sharÐÝah and at publicly determining the extent of revelation's pertinence for the political
sphere can be considered both appropriate and 'up-to-date'. It immediately addresses the
deficient popular and religious legitimacy of political rule in the contemporary Muslim world.
Al-GhanÙshÐ explicitly attributes the right to choose from policy options which are ethically
informed by religious interpretation to the people (as opposed to ÝulamÁ' or 'the state', only)
thus equally entitling the electorate to revise these options in the last instance. This must be
considered innovative, compared to both the historical practice of interpretation through the
ÝulamÁ' in the SunnÐ-world, and likewise the (modernist) ShÐÝi practice which has been insti-
tutionalised e.g. in the Iranian constitutional system by the "council of ÝulamÁ’/shÙrÁ-ye
negahbÁn".194 
Also with reference to aÒÁlah, the problematique of authenticity, reformist approaches from
within the respective tradition of thought may prove more effective in the process of mod-
ernisation of society than the supposedly clear cut with the legal heritage while hypocritically
preserving autocratic rule. The fact that even the more subtle Muslim reformists are de-
nounced as 'apostate' by militant Islamists (e.g. AbÙ Zayd), or alternatively 'fundamentalist'
by authoritarian secular regimes (e.g. al-GhanÙshÐ), that they are forced into exile (al-
GhanÙshÐ, temporarily SurÙsh) or, in some cases, put to death (Sudanese MaÎmÙd M.
ÓÁhÁ),195 suggests that the respective rulers of both, secular and synthetic political systems,
fear even those rather abstract reformist projects for their very normative persuasiveness
and their potential popular credibility–against the background of the general lack of all legiti-
macy which most contemporary political systems in the Muslim world suffer from.
De-essentialising 'tradition' vs. 'modernity', 'secular' vs. 'fundamentalist', 'authentic'
vs. 'imported': pre-requisites for the accommodation of plurality
Most of the reformist authors mentioned above, either expressly or at least implicitly ac-
knowledge the qualitative difference in the condition of contemporary as compared to by-
gone societies. Nevertheless a distinctness of Muslim societies as compared to liberal West-
ern societies is maintained in general. But because of the profound transformation of the
                                                          
192 Cf. Schacht (1966:94-111).
193 Cf. Edge 1995.
194 Cf. supra 1.2.4.
195 Despite denying eternal authority to the Medinese part of revelation, ÓÁhÁ had even affirmed the validity of
the sharÐÝah (including Îadd-penalties) for his reformist project of a 'Second Message' in Islam (based on the
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former on social, economic and cultural planes, the normative challenge is considered far too
complex to be answered by the mere reference to the 'Golden Age' of Islam. 
Instead, the contemporary Muslim reformist discourse as depicted here contributes to 'de-
essentialise' the established notions like 'modernity' and 'tradition', 'Islam' and 'the West' with
their respective semantic and historical heritage, thereby encouraging a radical plurality of
worldviews. Iranian president AyÁtullÁh M. KhÁtamÐ has been introduced as perhaps the
most prominent personality in point. He bids intellectual endeavour to be "equipped with both
critiques, the critique of [Western] modernity and the critique of [non-Western, BJT] tradi-
tion.196 Apparently not all conflationists consider the 'West' a holistic entity. Rather, there is a
differentiated view of Western political reality disjunct from Western political thought.197 
Furthermore, the critique of conflationist positions with regard to pluralism, not as usual from
the deconflationist/secularist pole of the Muslim discursive spectrum, must be considered as
an utmost courageous task. The most important achievement is the fact that the conflationist
perspective has thereby gained a fair degree of diversity without loosing its distinct 'Islamic'
frame. Under the presumption that such a plurality of views is not a problem, but rather part
of a larger unité de problématique–embedded into issues such as the questions of authen-
ticity, political participation, social justice and freedom–a unity of Islamic thought (unité de
pensée) on the modern condition of Muslim society can be maintained (Jabri 1995:62f).
Against this background, it seems justified to speak of a distinct Islamic modernity. 
It is to be remembered, however, that some of the important contributors to this discourse
live in exile (Arkoun, AbÙ Zaid, temporarily SurÙsh, al-GhanÙshÐ). This fact, far from putting
their claim on authenticity or their potential success in question, only underlines the urgency
of coming to terms with the plurality in Muslim societies, by transforming either nominally
'Islamic' or 'secular' authoritarian regimes into de facto 'democratic/shÙrÁtic' ones. Since this
is the shared goal of both Muslim activists and secular opposition groups, perspectives on
internal peace of Muslim soieties are not so dim, provided the theoretical conflationist-
deconflationist dichotomy ceases to be exploited as a means of de-legitimising the respec-
tive opponent a priori. 
                                                          
196 Cf. his contribution to the German daily, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 1st, 1998 and analogously
Arkoun's (1993) critique of the 'Hegemonic Reason'–both Western and Islamic!
197 Contrary to the popular stereotype of the uniformed 'Islamic fundamentalist', conflationist intellectuals such
as SurÙsh and KhÁtamÐ differentiate the various discursive traditions within Western thought, cf. e.g. al-
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